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1.1 Motivation  
 
 
The financial crisis of 2008 substantiated the crucial role of the stability of the banking sys-
tem for the economy. Globalization and increased competition drive higher efficiency in the 
financial industry. Despite of all improvements, efficiency progress, and strict regulations, a 
stable risk-return position of banks can unexpected easily be impaired. This fact motivated 
empirical work in recent years to assess performance and risk indicators in the banking indus-
try. In this framework, the trend of performance measurement has moved from accounting 
ratios through market values and realized rates of return to shareholder value. The maximiz-
ing of shareholder value creation has become the primary goal of companies. This measure 
considers not only key accounting ratios, market values and stock returns, but also takes ex-
plicitly opportunity cost of shareholders into account. Concerning the accounting-based 
shareholder value computation, key accounting ratios are involved in the determination. Here, 
accounting adjustments can lead to more economic meaning. The already proposed adjust-
ments in the literature (see Stewart (2008), Uyemura/Kantor/Pettit (1996), 
Fiordelisi/Molyneux (2010a)) have to be critically discussed and adapted for European banks 
that report under IFRS in this thesis. 
 
In numerous studies, bank-specific, industry-specific and macroeconomic parameters have 
been assessed regarding their influence on performance. This thesis concentrates on efficiency 
scores and corporate governance structures that drive stability in the banking industry. An 
efficient way of using resources allows banks to retain their stable position in strongly com-
petitive environments. Constructing non-parametric frontiers using the technique of data en-
velopment analysis, a range of efficiency scores can be evaluated. Thus, pure abilities to man-
age input and output quantities in an efficient way, abilities to choose the right operating size 
and to manage competitive input and output prices are investigated within this thesis. The 
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study of this thesis finds the evidence that not all abilities of managers are associated with the 
higher performance of banks. 
 
Effective internal corporate governance structures have crucial importance for the protection 
of shareholder’s interests. The board of directors, as the main body of the internal governance 
system, serves to solve the agency problems that occur due to the separation of ownership and 
control. This thesis examines whether board characteristics can lead to improvements of 
bank’s performance. Board size, board independence and gender diversity on the board can 
influence board’s decision making process and, therefore, the operative activity of a financial 
institution. Characteristics of the chief executive officer and chairman of the board might also 
be crucial for strategic decisions, monitoring and management of a company. The important 
intermediation role of banks in the economy emphasizes the vital responsibility of boards to 
protect shareholders’ and debtholders’ interests. 
 
 
1.2 Literature Review  
 
 
Importance of the banking industry for the economy motivated a number of studies to focus 
on different indicators, which influence performance and risk-taking behavior of banks. A 
variety of internal and external factors were examined that influence the stability of the finan-
cial sector. Thus, the empirical investigations of Short (1979), Bourke (1989), Moly-
neux/Thornton (1992) include cross-country samples of banks in Europe, North America, 
Canada, Australia and Japan. The impact of bank-specific (staff expenses, capital ratios, li-
quidity ratios, asset growth), macroeconomic (interest rates, inflation, money supply) and in-
dustry-specific (government ownership, concentration ratio, market share, economies of 
scale) determinants on profitability was estimated using linear regression models.  
 
Capital ratios as risk buffer instruments show a positive impact on profitability of banks, since 
the reduction in risk implies access to cheaper sources of funds (see Bourke (1989) and Mo-
lyneux/Thornton (1992)). The effect of liquidity risk on profitability is ambiguous: the study 
of Molyneux/Thornton (1992) reports a negative significant result, in contrast Bourke (1989) 
finds a positive relationship. Payroll expenditures show a positive relation with profitability 
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(see Bourke (1989) and Molyneux/Thornton (1992)) indicating an expense preference behav-
ior in banking (see Molyneux/Thornton (1992)). Higher staff expenses are connected with 
more productive human capital and, therefore, with better-quality management (see Athana-
soglou/Brissimis/Delis (2008)). 
 
Cross-country analysis shows a significant positive impact of the concentration level on prof-
itability (see Short (1979), Bourke (1989), and Molyneux/Thornton (1992)). Approximating 
market share expanding with the growth of assets, Short (1979) obtains no significant effect 
on profit. The study of Smirlock (1985) provides, however, a strong positive relationship be-
tween market share, defined as deposits of the bank over total deposits in the market, and 
profitability. Additionally, his results indicate that market share and not the level of concen-
tration influences the profitability. The size of a bank is assumed to determine existing 
economies of scale in the market, since large banks through additional diversification can 
decrease their costs (see Smirlock (1985)). Testing for economies of scale in the banking in-
dustry, Short (1979) finds no relationship between bank size and performance. It was also 
investigated, whether the ownership structure influences the level of profitability. Some stud-
ies show that government-owned banks generated lower returns then privately-owned (see 
Short (1979) and Bourke (1989)). Molyneux/Thornton (1992) report, however, the opposite 
results.  
 
Interest rates as proxies for capital scarcity were analysed as macroeconomic determinants of 
profitability. The findings report a significant positive relationship (see Short (1979), Bourke 
(1989), and Molyneux/Thornton (1992)). Money supply and inflation rate indicate also a posi-
tive influence on profitability (see Bourke (1989) and Molyneux/Thornton (1992)). 
 
More recent studies additionally examine the correlation between business cycle and profit of 
the bank. Bikker/Hu (2002) find a positive relationship between cyclical output and perform-
ance in OECD countries. In order to identify the business cycle, the authors use macroeco-
nomic parameters as real GDP growth, unemployment rate etc. Deviations of real GDP from 
its trend determines the cyclical output in the study of Athanasoglou/Brissimis/Delis (2008) 
that concentrates only on Greek commercial banks. Their results show that procyclical per-
formance development was obtained only during upturn periods. In downturns, stage banks 
were able to insulate their performance. 
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There is another group of studies that concentrates on activity diversification of banks. Using 
risk-adjusted performance measures, Stiroh/Rumble (2006) report gains of revenue diversity 
between US financial holding companies. The benefits, however, are offset by increased risk 
exposure from more volatile activities. Lepetit et al. (2008) confirm increasing risk of Euro-
pean banks that are moving towards non-interest activities. The cross-country studies of 
Laeven/Levine (2007) and Elsas/Hackethal/Holzhäuser (2010) examine, whether diversifica-
tion influences market values of financial institutions. Using the excess market-to-book ratio, 
Laeven/Levine (2007) find that diversification reduces the market value of financial conglom-
erates. Elsas/Hackethal/Holzhäuser (2010) show, in contrast, that diversification has a posi-
tive indirect effect on valuation, since it improves the profitability of a bank. The latter is 
measured as difference between return and cost of capital. Even replicating the regression 
analysis of Laeven/Levine (2007) and controlling for the profitability measure, they show that 
significant the negative relation disappears.  
 
The influence of ownership structure as a corporate governance element is extended in recent 
studies. Iannotta/Nocera/Sironi (2007) take two dimensions of ownership structure into con-
sideration. Concerning the ownership forms of European banks, they analyse performance 
differences of mutual, public, and private banks. Simultaneously, they assess the impact of 
ownership concentration on performance. The main results of their empirical research show 
that private banks are more profitable compared to government-owned and mutual banks. At 
the same time, private banks have lower loan quality and higher insolvency risk than mutual 
and public banks. Ownership concentration, measured as share percentage held by the largest 
shareholder, exhibits no significant influence on the profitability of banks. However, more 
concentrated banks are associated with lower level of risk determined by loan quality, insol-
vency distance and asset return volatility. In contrast, Laeven/Levine (2009) find a positive 
impact of large owners with high cash flow rights on risk-taking behavior of banks. Assessing 
country-specific bank regulations, the study also shows that activity restrictions and regula-
tory oversight of bank capital have either positive or negative effects on risk taking depending 
on the ownership structure. Cash flow right concentration diminishes the risk reduction effect 
that bank regulations cause. 
 
Caprio/Laeven/Levine (2007) determine ownership concentration as a sum of direct and indi-
rect cash flow rights of the controlling owner. The degree of cash flow rights concentration, 
as an important governance mechanism, appears to boost bank valuation. However, greater 
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cash flow rights are associated with a higher valuation in countries with weaker law protec-
tion of shareholder minority. 
 
Barry/Lepetit/Tarazi (2011) carry out the further analysis concerning the ownership structure 
of banks. They investigate whether a change in ownership from institutional investors, who 
hold diversified investment portfolios, to another owner category affects risk-taking behavior 
of European commercial banks. They observe a risk difference mainly for privately owned 
banks, but not for publicly traded banks. Significant lower risk is recognized in commercial 
banks with a higher stake of individuals/families and banking institutions. The study also 
shows that that non-financial companies and institutional investors do not differ in risk-return 
objectives. 
 
A new aspect in research literature is dedicated to efficiency measurement and its influence 
on performance of banks. Empirical investigations use two main methodologies to estimate 
efficiency of banks: stochastic frontier approach (SFA) and data envelopment analysis (DEA). 
Berger (1995) started analyzing whether X-efficiency or scale-efficiency causes lower costs 
and therefore higher profits, where these efficiencies are defined as follows: X-efficiency re-
sults from superior management abilities or better production technologies. Scale-efficiency, 
despite of the equal quality of management or technologies, affords lower unit costs due to 
more efficient scale production. The results of this study showed that higher profitability of 
US banks was driven by X-efficiency rather than scale-efficiency in the 1980s. 
 
Further research shows that the level of cost efficiency determines also the risk taking behav-
ior of banks. Less cost efficient banks tend to have higher non-performing loans, whereas an 
increase in non-performing loans is followed by the deterioration of cost efficiency (see Ber-
ger/DeYoung (1997)). Inefficient banks in the USA tend to have higher capital risk, interest 
rate risk and, therefore, have to meet higher capital requirements (see Kwan/Eisenbeis 
(1997)). 
 
There is also evidence that banks with different ownership structures exhibit differences in 
their efficiency levels (see Altunbas/Evans/Molyneux (2001)). Segmentation of banks in sub-
samples regarding ownership features provides different results. A European sample of banks 
contrasts the US finding, and appears to have a negative relationship between inefficiency and 
risk (see Altunbas et al. (2007)). However, inefficient commercial and savings banks have 
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higher capitalization, whereas inefficient cooperative banks hold less capital (see Altunbas et 
al. (2007)). 
 
In order to measure performance, the aforementioned empirical studies focus on accounting 
ratios. Beccalli/Casu/Girardone (2006) extend the empirical research with the cross-country 
investigation of efficiency influences on stock price fluctuations. In contrast to previous stud-
ies, they use both DEA and SFA approaches to estimate European bank-efficiency scores. 
The ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results determine the significant positive rela-
tionship between changes in efficiency and stock prices. The DEA efficiency scores provide 
higher explanatory power compared to the SFA results. Interestingly, the investigation obtains 
no significant influence of income-to-cost relation on stock price changes. Even expanding 
the regression models with additional accounting proxies for size, risk and profitability does 
not provide a significant increase in explanatory power. These findings support the higher 
relevance of efficiency compared to simple accounting ratios in performance measurement of 
banks. 
 
Additionally to investigated cost and profit (see, e.g., Chu/Lim (1998)) efficiency parameters, 
Fiordelisi (2007) creates shareholder value efficiency. The idea behind this measure is to 
achieve the maximum possible shareholder value with a given level of output. The share-
holder value is determined applying the economic value added (EVA) method. According to 
this approach, a company creates value if its operating profit exceeds the cost of invested 
capital. Since this measure provides good results in determination of company’s achieved 
performance (see, e.g., Abate/Grant/Stewart (2004)), it can measure performance of unlisted 
banks despite missing stock prices (see, e.g., Fiordelisi (2007), Fiordelisi/Molyneux (2010a), 
Fiordelisi/Molyneux (2010b)). The evidence of Fiordelisi (2007) approves that shareholder 
efficiency measure compared to cost and profit efficiency has greater explanatory power con-
cerning the shareholder value creation.  
 
The further study of Fiordelisi/Molyneux (2010a) concentrates not only on efficiency parame-
ters, but also simultaneously investigates efficiency, bank-specific, industry-specific and mac-
roeconomics determinants of value creation. Assessing the shareholder value driving process, 
EVA is divided into two main components (economic profit and cost of capital) in order to 
find the way of factor influences. The results show that revenue efficiency increases economic 
profit, whereas cost efficiency reduces cost of capital. The leverage drives higher economic 
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profits but at the same time causes higher cost of capital (leverage effect), offsetting any EVA 
relation. Market risk effects decline in economic profit, which is reflected in shareholder 
value. Larger banks appear to have higher cost of capital, which are, however, outperformed 
by improvements in profit. 
 
Measurement of efficiency applying DEA allows determining the components of cost effi-
ciency (technical, allocative, and scale efficiency). With this data, the total factor productivity 
(TFP) change1 and its corresponding components can be assessed. Fiorde-
lisi/Molyneux (2010b) show that, compared to different efficiency measures, TFP changes 
best explain value creation of listed and unlisted European banks. Among TFP components, 
technological improvements have the highest explanatory power of shareholder value varia-
tion and scale efficiency the lowest one. 
 
Fiordelisi/Marques-Ibanez/Molyneux (2011) analyse a simultaneous link between efficiency, 
risk and capital in a sample of European commercial banks using the Granger-causality meth-
odology. Their results suggest that higher cost and/or revenue efficiency causes a lower one-
year default probability of banks, and thinly capitalized banks are more likely to reduce their 
cost efficiency. 
 
In order to find the determinants of bank performance, the first group of empirical studies 
focused on accounting measures, which do not take the value creation process of banks into 
consideration (see, e.g., Molyneux/Thornton (1992), Berger (1995)). Further studies concen-
trate on the ability of banks to generate returns to shareholders and, therefore, stock price 
changes are used in the investigations (see, e.g., Beccalli/Casu/Girardone (2006), Fiorde-
lisi/Molyneux (2010b)). Market returns, however, do not take cost of capital into account, 
which are crucial for the shareholders’ value creation. Performance determination with the 
EVA approach considers cost of invested capital (see, e.g., Fiordelisi (2007), Fiorde-
lisi/Molyneux (2010a), Fiordelisi/Molyneux (2010b)). However, this approach is based on 
accounting profit and capital measures. The investigations of this thesis extend already exist-
ing empirical studies using also the market-oriented shareholder value determination. 
 
                                                 
1
  TFP change, also known as Malmquist index (see Malmquist (1953)), measures productivity change over 
time (see Asmild et al. (2004)). 
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Measuring efficiency in the banking industry, some studies consider deposits as output factor 
(see, e.g., Berger (1995), Berger/DeYoung (1997), Fiordelisi (2007), Fiordelisi/Molyneux 
(2010a), Fiordelisi/Marques-Ibanez/Molyneux (2011)), some investigations use deposits as 
input (see, e.g., Berger/Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006), Beccalli/Casu/Girardone (2006)), and sev-
eral studies do not take deposits into consideration (see, e.g., Altunbas/Evans/Molyneux 
(2001), Altunbas et al. (2007)). In this thesis, both production and intermediation models of 
DEA efficiency estimation are applied for efficiency estimation. Using the intermediation 
model, deposits are considered as bank financial source. In the production model, deposits 
belong to operating activity and are part of business results (outputs) of banks. 
 
In field of corporate governance, only ownership structure and ownership concentration were 
widely investigated in banking industry. The board structure and corresponding features are 
scarce in the banking literature. The studies of Belkhir (2009) and Andres/Vallelado (2009) 
examine the influence of several board characteristics on valuation of US and international 
banks, respectively. They found a positive influence of large boards on performance of banks. 
Andres/Vallelado (2009) report, however, an inverted U-shaped relationship between Tobin’s 
q and board size. Chief executive officer (CEO)-chairman duality has, interestingly, also a 
positive impact on market value, as Belkhir (2009) finds.  
 
Pathan (2009) examines the impact of board characteristics on US banks’ risk-taking behav-
ior. His findings indicate that small boards and boards with less restrictive shareholders’ 
rights are associated with more risk-taking, what reflects the shareholders’ interests. More 
independent boards and boards with higher CEO power in controlling decisions exhibit lower 
risk behavior. 
 
This thesis extends already existing findings and deeper analyzes the governance-performance 
relation in the European banking industry. Controlling for cost efficiency level, the general-
ized method of moments (GMM) estimation technique is applied, which takes all possible 
sources of endogeneity into consideration. The board characteristics such as board size, board 
independence, gender diversity, existence and number of committees are assessed in this the-
sis. The CEO characteristics like CEO duality, CEO tenure and CEO age are considered in the 
estimation. The case where the chairman of the board heads the audit committee is also taken 
into account.  
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Thus, this thesis empirically analyzes the impact of efficiency and corporate governance char-
acteristics on key performance figures of European commercial banks. The empirical investi-
gations of the thesis focus on publicly traded commercial banks from 27 European countries 
between 2004 and 2009. To guarantee the quality of the analysis, the required financial data 
was mostly hand-collected directly from the banks’ financial statements. To eliminate differ-
ences in accounting standards, annual financial statements reported under IFRS were consid-
ered. Analyzing efficiency and corporate governance of the European banking industry, this 
study contributes to already existing empirical work on performance and risk indicators in 
banking. 
 
This thesis contributes to the literature in several ways. At first, production and intermediation 
approaches of efficiency determination are compared in explaining return-risk positions of 
banks. Secondly, decomposition of efficiencies into their components shows how managers’ 
abilities are reflected in capital market performance of banks. Thirdly, not only popular share-
holder value creation based on accounting figures is considered, but also capital market value 
creation is assessed. Fourthly in the robustness check, not only loan loss provisions, as a popu-
lar accounting-based risk measure, are used, but also realized losses on loans in form of direct 
write-downs and/or utilization of corresponding provisions. Fifthly, the governance-
performance relation is estimated in European banking industry, which includes three types of 
board structure. Sixthly, the GMM technique is applied to estimate the governance-
performance relation, where gender diversity and CEO personal characteristics are involved in 
the analysis. Finally, hand-collected financial data guarantees the quality of accounting figures 
and governance measures used for the analysis. 
 
 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
 
 
The thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 describes efficiency, performance, and risk 
measures used in the study. Cost, revenue, profit efficiency and their decomposition into 
scale, pure technical and allocative efficiency are presented in Section 2.1. This section in-
cludes also the description of the Malmquist productivity index and its decomposition into 
technological change, pure technical efficiency change and scale efficiency change. The de-
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scription of used inputs, outputs and their prices within the production and the intermediation 
approaches are presented in Section 2.1. Section 2.2 presents a description and computation 
techniques of performance parameters. Here, stock performance, Tobin’s q and market-to-
book ratio are described. Also, market- and accounting-oriented shareholder value created are 
presented in this section. Computing residual income, several accounting adjustments are 
needed. They are also analyzed in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 provides the calculation of risk 
measures, which are volatility of stock returns, probability of default, distance to default and 
loan loss provisions. 
 
Chapter 3 describes the data used in the analysis. Summary statistics of the performance and 
risk variables are presented in Section 3.1. The data concerning the inputs and outputs used 
for efficiency estimation is summarized in Section 3.2. This section provides also the effi-
ciency analysis of the sample banks during the assessed period. Chapter 4 deals with the em-
pirical analysis of the efficiency-performance relation. Section 4.1 reports results of compari-
son of the adjusted and non-adjusted residual income in explaining stock performance. Sec-
tion 4.2 presents the difference test between the production and the intermediation models of 
efficiency estimation. The empirical results of efficiency impact on performance of banks are 
reported in Section 4.3. 
 
Chapter 5 deals with the governance-performance relation. The measures of corporate gov-
ernance used in the study are described in Section 5.1. Section 5.2 presents summary statistics 
of the corporate governance variables. Econometric methods and empirical results are pro-
vided in Section 5.3. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the thesis. 
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2 Definition of Variables 
 
 
2.1 Efficiency and Productivity Change 
 
 
Empirical studies in banking use two competing methodologies to estimate efficiency struc-
tures of banks: stochastic frontier approach (SFA) and data envelopment analysis (DEA). Re-
gression-based SFA specifies a functional form for the production, cost or profit functions. 
Random errors and inefficiencies, according to this approach, are assumed to follow specific 
distribution functions. The non-parametric DEA approach is a linear programming technique 
that constructs the efficient frontier based on the set of best-practice observations and meas-
ures efficiency relative to this frontier.2 
 
DEA is commonly used to analyze various notions of relative efficiency such as cost, reve-
nue, and profit efficiency of similar (homogenous) organizational units, so-called decision-
making units (DMUs), in term of utilization of input resources in generating outputs. The 
DEA approach is based on Farrell (1957) and on extensions of his work by Char-
nes/Cooper/Rhodes (1978) and Banker/Charnes/Cooper (1984), who introduced a non-
parametric framework to measure and compare DMUs’ relative efficiency. Since then, DEA 
has developed in many directions and applications, as summarized by Emrouzne-
jad/Parker/Tavares (2008), who cite almost four thousand publications. DEA is also wide-
spread applied in the banking industry. Berger/Humphrey (1997) and Fethi/Pasiouras (2010) 
present a review of numerous studies, which assess bank performance with DEA techniques. 
 
In the area of banking, the DMUs of assessment could be a bank branch (compared to other 
bank branches), a bank (compared to other banks), or a banking system (compared to other 
banking systems). DEA offers several advantages in assessing the relative efficiency of 
DMUs. The primary advantage of this methodology is the non-parametric nature and its abil-
ity to handle multiple outputs and multiple inputs. In fact, it can consider multiple outputs and 
                                                 
2
  See Berger/Humphrey (1997). 
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inputs without recourse to a priori weights and without requiring explicit specification of 
functional forms between inputs and outputs. Another advantage of DEA, which attracts ana-
lysts and management, is its ability to identify the potential improvement for inefficient 
DMUs. In other words, from a computational point of view, it constructs a piecewise frontier 
(efficient frontier) with the calculation of a maximal efficiency measure for each DMU rela-
tive to all other observed DMUs. Hence, it identifies a subset of efficient "best-practice" 
DMUs. For the remaining DMUs, the magnitude of their non-efficiency is measured by com-
paring to a frontier constructed from efficient DMUs. Thus, efficient units lie on the efficient 
frontier with an efficient score of 1.0, and the other units are considered to be inefficient with 
efficient scores less then 1.0. 
 
Moreover, Malmquist productivity indices3, which are widely used to measure DMUs’ pro-
ductivity changes over time, can be measured by DEA models. Thus, it can not only measure 
productivity changes of DMUs, but it also has the ability to measure the impact of important 
factors affecting productivity such as technical and pure technical efficiencies, technology and 
economic scale. In other words, when analyzing data of changes in productivity for more than 
one period, it becomes problematic as this can be associated with changes other than effi-
ciency, e.g., scale and technological changes. It is noticeable that this is particularly important 
in the banking industry, where technological changes and scale of units play important roles 
as two crucial success factors. 
 
 
Technical, Pure Technical and Scale Efficiency 
 
 
Technical efficiency (TE) reflects how efficient a bank uses a given level of inputs to produce 
the maximum level of outputs (output orientation), or how efficient a bank can produce the 
given level of outputs with the minimum quantity of inputs (input orientation). In order to 
present this optimization problem, consider a set of units j=1,…,n, with input levels 
),,,( 21 mjjjj x...xxX =  and output levels ),,,( 21 sjjjj y...yyY = and unit k (k=1,…,n), which is to be 
                                                 
3
  Malmquist index (see Malmquist (1953)) measures productivity change over time (see Asmild et al. (2004)). 
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assessed. The input technical efficiency of the unit under evaluation is measured by the fol-




























The construction of efficient frontiers under the assumption of CRS was introduced by Char-
nes/Cooper/Rhodes (1978) and, therefore, is named after the authors as CCR model. Remov-
ing the assumption of CRS, the BCC model (see Banker/Charnes/Cooper (1984)) allows the 
decomposition of technical efficiency into the product of pure technical efficiency (PTE) and 
scale efficiency (SE): 
 
(2) SEPTETE ⋅= . 
 
Pure technical efficiency measures technical efficiency exclusive scale effects. It reflects the 
pure ability of managers to organize the optimal utilization of resources.5 An operating input-
oriented unit’s pure technical efficiency, satisfying variable returns to scale (VRS), is deter-































Scale efficiency measures the ability of managers to choose the optimum size of a bank to 
generate a certain production level. In case of decreasing returns to scale, a bank is too large 
to obtain advantages from scale. If a bank operates with increasing returns to scale, the size of 
the bank is too small for its scale of operations. Constant returns to scale indicate scale effi-
                                                 
4
  For output-oriented determination of technical efficiency see Charnes/Cooper/Rhodes (1978). 
5
  See Kumar/Gulati (2008). 
6
  For output-oriented model see Banker/Charnes/Cooper (1984). 
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ciency of a bank.7 Thus, measuring the impact of scale size on technical efficiency of the unit 




TESESEPTETE =⇒⋅= . 
 
 
Cost, Revenue and Profit Efficiency 
 
 
With available prices of input and output factors, cost, revenue, and profit efficiency can be 
estimated. Cost efficiency reflects the managers’ ability to minimize cost given a certain level 
of outputs. Cost efficiency is the product of technical and input allocative efficiency (IAE), 
where technical efficiency comprises scale and pure technical efficiency. In case of cost effi-
ciency, pure technical efficiency with input orientation reflects the ability to produce a given 
level of outputs with the minimum quantity of inputs. Here, scale efficiency describes the 
ability to choose the optimum input size. Allocative efficiency reflects a cost-efficient mix of 
inputs given their prices.8 Mathematically, consider again the set of units j=1,…,n, with input 
levels ),,,( 21 mjjjj x...xxX =  and output levels ),,,( 21 sjjjj y...yyY = and unit k (k=1,…,n), which 
is to be assessed. Assume, input prices are denoted by ijw , i=1,…,m and output prices are 
denoted by rjp , r=1,…,s for unit j=1,…,n. Cost efficiency (CE) of unit k is measured by the 

































Subsequently, input allocative efficiency (IAE), measuring input price efficiency of the unit 
under assessment, is defined by the following relation: 
 
                                                 
7
  See Kumar/Gulati (2008). 
8




CEIAETEIAECE =⇒⋅= . 
 
Revenue efficiency (RE) indicates whether a bank achieves the maximum level of revenue 
using a given quantity of inputs. Revenue efficiency of unit k is measured by the actual reve-

































Revenue efficiency also comprises technical efficiency and allocative efficiency − now with 
output orientation −, where, again, technical efficiency is the product of output-oriented pure 
technical (OPTE) and output-oriented scale efficiency (OSE). Here, pure technical efficiency 
mirrors the ability to produce the maximum level of outputs with a given quantity of inputs. 
The ability to choose the optimal output size is measured by scale efficiency, whereas the 
ability to manage the optimal production mix regarding its prices is reflected by output 
allocative efficiency (OAE). Thus, OAE estimates the output price efficiency of the unit under 




REOAETEOAERE =⇒⋅= . 
 
Profit efficiency (PE) takes both the cost minimization and the revenue maximization proc-
esses into consideration. Profit efficiency of unit k is calculated through the actual profit di-





















































The decomposition of profit efficiency into pure technical, scale and allocative efficiency is 
not straightforward (see Coelli et al. (2005), pp. 185−186). Therefore, profit efficiency is not 
decomposed in this study. 
 
 
Malmquist Productivity Index  
 
 
The Malmquist productivity index (MI) measures the total factor productivity changes over 
time. In order to calculate the Malmquist index, consider a set of units j=1,…,n in time period 
t (t=1,…,T) with input levels )( 21 tmjt jt jtj ,...,x,xxX =  and output levels )( 21 tsjt jt jtj ,...,y,yyY = . The 
Malmquist index, which measures productivity changes for unit k (k=1,…,n) between periods 



















































where ),(TE tktkt YX  and ),(TE 111 +++ tktkt YX can be computed by optimization problem (1) in pe-
riods t and t+1, respectively. For the computation of ),(TE 1 tptpt YX+  and ),(TE 11 ++ tptpt YX , two 
DEA models based on problem (1) have to be solved that have a mixed period problem. 
 
With respect to the decomposition of the Malmquist index, Färe et al. (1992) identified two 
important factors, namely, efficiency and technology changes, which affect productivity over 
time. According to the FGLR (see Färe/Grosskopf/Lindgren/Roos (1992)) decomposition, the 
Malmquist index is decomposed into technological change (TC) and technical efficiency 
change (TEC):  
 
(11) TCTECMI ⋅= , 
 

































































The TEC is supposed to measure the change in the technical efficiency of unit k between two 
periods, and the TC is the component that measures technological improvement between two 
periods (i.e., shift in the efficient frontier).  
 
Considering the variable returns to scale, the technical efficiency change (TEC) was decom-
posed by Färe et al. (1994) into pure technical efficiency change (PTEC) and scale efficiency 
change (SEC): 
 
(12) TCSEC PTECMI ⋅⋅= , 
 

































































This FGNZ (see Färe/Grosskopf/Norris/Zhang (1994)) decomposition of the Malmquist index 
provides a clearer picture of the basic sources of productivity change. PTEC measures the 
managerial effort of unit k between two periods, and SEC estimates scale improvement be-
tween two periods. TC is calculated as presented in formula (11). The values of ),(PTE tktkt YX  
and ),(PTE 111 +++ tktkt YX  can be calculated by problem (3) in periods t and t+1, respectively. 
 
After computation of the Malmquist index and its components for the unit under evaluation 
between periods t and t+1, the obtained results can be interpreted as follows: 
 
• (PTEC) TEC > 1 implies that (pure) technical efficiency growth has occurred; (PTEC) 
TEC < 1 means that (pure) technical efficiency has declined. 
• SEC > 1 implies that scale efficiency has increased; SEC < 1 means that scale efficiency 
has decreased. 
• TC > 1 implies that technological improvement has occurred; TC < 1 means that tech-
nology has declined. 
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• Finally, MI > 1 implies that productivity progress has occurred; MI < 1 means that 
productivity reduction has been observed. 
 
Regardless of input- or output-oriented calculations, the Malmquist index shows the same 







In order to estimate efficiency, input and output factors of banks’ activities must be deter-
mined. Two popular models are specified in the literature to evaluate the banking industry: 
the production and the intermediation approach.9 Within the production model, banks are con-
sidered as operating units that use labor, capital, and other resources to provide their products 
and services. Therefore, number of employees and fixed assets are used as input factors. In 
contrast to production companies, fixed assets in banking are of minor importance. However, 
software plays an important role in banking. Thus, the value of fixed assets is extended by the 
value of software in this study. 
 
Equity and securitized financial liabilities are taken into consideration as invested capital. 
Equity is an important factor in banking, since, according to the Basel accords, equity limits 
the volume of risky activities of banks. Furthermore, securitized financial liabilities are con-
sidered as invested debt capital. With these input factors (resources) banks provide loans to 
the public, corporate customers, other banks etc. They invest in securitized financial assets 
and manage deposits of both banks and customers. Banks also offer services that are linked to 
the fee and commission income. Thus, loans, securitized financial assets, deposits, and net 
commission income are used as output factors in the production model. 
 
The intermediation approach treats banks as financial intermediaries, which collect their mon-
etary funds from savers and investors and transpose these funds into further investments. In 
this approach, equity, securitized financial liabilities, and deposits characterize the input fac-
tors of banks. Outputs are loans, securitized financial assets, and net commission income. 
                                                 
9
  See Asmild et al. (2004). 
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Thus, deposits are considered as output in the production model and as input in the intermedi-
ation model (see Table 1). According to Berger/Humphrey (1997), neither of these two ap-
proaches of efficiency determination is perfect, since both models do not fully capture the 
dual role of financial institutions as producing services and being financial intermediaries. 
Thus, both models are applied, in order to compare the results regarding the respective influ-
encing factors on banks’ performance and risk. 
 
 Production model Intermediation model 
Inputs 
• Number of employees 
• Fixed assets 
• Equity 
• Financial liabilities 
• Equity 




• Financial assets 
• Deposits 
• Net commission income 
• Loans 
• Financial assets 










• Equity: Required return of equity holders 









depositson  expensesInterest 
 
• Financial assets: 
assets Financial
assets financialon  incomeInterest 
 





Table 1: Input and output factors of the production and the intermediation model 
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In order to assess cost, revenue and profit efficiency, the prices of inputs and outputs are 
needed. The price for a unit of labor is calculated as total personnel expenses divided by the 
yearly average number of employees. The costs of fixed assets are computed as depreciations 
plus interest payments assuming debt-financed fixed assets. Here, the value of software and 
corresponding depreciations are also taken into account. The required return on equity deter-
mines the cost of equity and is estimated with the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). The 
prices for financial liabilities, financial assets, deposits, and loans are calculated by the ratio 
of the respective income or expense position over the value of the corresponding input or out-
put factor. The net commission price per unit is determined as net commission income over 
the yearly average number of employees (see, again, Table 1). 
 
 
2.2 Performance Measures 
 
 
Stock performance, Tobin’s q, market-to-book ratio, and shareholder value created are used to 
measure performance of banks in the following. Market-oriented as well as accounting-based 
measures are examined in the study. Stock performance, measured by the average return ( R ) 
of a company’s stock, reflects market information. Tobin’s q and market-to-book ratio include 
both market and accounting data. Analyzing shareholder value created, accounting-based re-
sidual income is calculated. Additionally, shareholder value added (Jensen’s alpha) is deter-






In order to determine the annual stock performance of the company, the realized discretely 
compounded average rate of return ( R ) is used. Measuring the achieved average rate of re-
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turn during a period only two price observations are needed, namely the price at the beginning 


















Adjusted prices are used for calculations eliminating price differences due to dividend pay-






Brainard/Tobin (1968) introduced a basic macroeconomic concept of investment behavior. 
Investments are encouraged if the market value of invested capital is higher than its replace-
ment costs. It is provided in the case, when the returns from corporate investments are greater 
than the market yield of equity.  
 
In companies, replacement costs represent costs that are needed to cover all items on the 
firm’s balance sheet. The ratio of market value to replacement costs (Tobin’s q) exceeds 
unity, if the internal rate of return of the investment is greater than cost of capital. This condi-
tion boosts the value and reflects the performance of the firm. A higher Tobin’s q can result 
from higher returns to scale or from investment risk reduction caused by a superior risk-return 
trade off.11 
 
Tobin’s q is widely used in empirical research as a proxy for operating performance of com-
panies. The wide range of studies investigate the positive influence of good corporate govern-
ance on Tobin’s q (see, e.g., Lee/Lee (2009), Bebchuk/Cohen/Ferrell (2009), Bhagat/Bolton 
(2008), Coles/Naveen/Naveen (2008), Caprio/Laeven/Levine (2007)). Some studies analyze 
                                                 
10
  In case of continuously compounded average rate of return ( cR ) only two price observation are also 
needed:  






R Tc =  
11
  See Tobin (1969); Tobin/Brainard (1977); Tobin (1978).  
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the relation between diversification (see, e.g., Lang/Stulz (1994)), presence of derivative fi-
nancial contracts (see, e.g., Roll/Schwartz/Subrahmanyam (2009), Allayannis/Weston (2001)) 
and Tobin’s q as a proxy for market valuation of firms’ assets. 
 
In order to measure Tobin’s q, replacement costs of assets are approximated with the book 
value of assets. The market value of assets is equal to the sum of equity market value and 




assets of Book value
sliabilitie of Book value equity of ueMarket val
assets of Book value














equity of Book value
equity of ueMarket valM/B = . 
 
Since this multiple concentrates on equity value, it is meaningful for the evaluation of the 
performance of banks. 
 
 
Economic Value Added (EVA) 
 
 
All valuation models implicitly consider that a firm creates its wealth if it earns more than its 
cost of capital. The residual income model, derived from the dividend discount model under 
                                                 
12
  Bebchuk/Cohen/Ferrell (2009) and Bhagat/Bolton (2008) following Gompers/Ishii/Metrick (2003) addition-
ally subtract the value of deferred taxes. 
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the clean surplus assumption,13 shows explicitly, that the intrinsic market value of a company 
( 0MV ) exceeds its book value ( 0B ) only if the forecasted rate of return on common equity 


































































These abnormal earnings14 or residual income (RI), defined as accounting earnings minus 
capital charge on equity, drive the value creation of a company. 
 
Using the residual income idea, Stern Stewart & Company derived a trademarked economic 
value added (EVA) model. The model is entity-oriented: it concerns the earnings and cost of 
capital of both equity and debt holders. Hence, EVA is defined as:15 
 
(17) )()WACC(ROATCWACCNOPATEVA 111 −− +⋅−=⋅−= ttttt-ttt DE , 
 
where NOPAT stands for net operating profit after taxes, that concerns pre-interest earnings 
(EBIT) of the company: 
 
(18) )1(EBITNOPAT tr−⋅= , 
 tr = Tax rate. 
 
Total invested capital is presented as a sum of equity (E) and debt (D). EVA determines a 
surplus of operating profits over capital charge. Weighted average cost of capital (WACC) 
presents the overall capital cost rate that is required by investors of a company: 
                                                 
13
  For a derivation see Ohlson (1995) and Feltham/Ohlson (1995). 
14
  See Feltham/Ohlson (1995). 
15
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In case that the achieved rate of return of a company (return on assets (ROA)) is higher than 
its cost of capital, an excess return leads to positive EVA and, therefore, promotes the value 
creation process. 
 
The EVA concept includes many adjustments to the accounting values of NOPAT and in-
vested capital, in order to direct these accounting components towards meaningful economic 
values. Stern Stewart indicated more than 150 possible adjustments, but only a few of them 
are commonly applied in companies.16 Some of the major accounting adjustments are re-
search and development (R&D) costs, deferred taxes, purchased goodwill, operating leases, 
provisions for bad debts, and restructuring charges. Uyemura/Kantor/Pettit (1996) present 
common bank-specific adjustments, that cover loan loss provisions, deferred taxes, non-
recurring events (e.g., restructuring charges), and securities accounting. Stern Stewart & 
Company representatives show the strong relation between EVA development and wealth 
creation (see O’Byrne (1996), Abate/Grant/Stewart (2004)). Other authors, though, have not 
achieved supporting results of EVA superiority (see Biddle/Bowen/Wallace (1997 and 
2005)). The contradicting results and discussions indicate that not all adjustments are appro-
priate for every company. The adopted adjustments must eliminate accounting distortions and 
lead to EVA improvements in explaining market values. The adopted set of adjustments, in-
dustry specifics and different reporting standards must be taken into consideration. Assessing 
US and Canadian companies, Feltham et al. (2004) obtained different results concerning the 
EVA superiority, since both countries report under different GAAP. 
 
The EVA concept represents an entity valuation framework, i.e., the value of a company for 
both equity and debt holders. Therefore, it takes into account earnings for both types of inves-
tors and correspondingly the total invested capital. Thus, the operating profit before interest 
payments is considered calculating EVA. However, interest expenses in banking belong to its 
operating activity. Creating deposits or selling debt instruments represent a core activity of a 
bank. Due to this financial institution specific, profits before interest expenses do not lead to 
                                                 
16
  See Young/O’Byrne (2001), pp. 259 and 267. 
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economically meaningful interpretations. Subtracting interest expenses from operating profits 
leads to an equity valuation framework. On this basis, equity-oriented EVA is determined as 
excess income over capital charges on equity (residual income): 
 
(20) 1,NIRI t-tEtt Br ⋅−= . 
 
In order to avoid possible accounting distortions and obtain an economic residual income, 
several adjustments are made to the net income and book value of equity in this study. 
 
The first adjustment concerns loan loss provisions. The provisions for possible loan losses (or 
loan loss reserve, allowance for loan losses) of European banks reported under IFRS are 
shown on the asset site of the balance sheet with minus sign (see Figure 1). This position re-
duces the value of gross loans by future expected losses, which occur due to credit (default) 
risk of lending business. The value of this position is generally determined as a difference 
between the carrying value (book value) of an asset and the present value of the future ex-
pected repayment cash flows from the borrower. The positive difference indicates that not all 
interest and principal payments will be made as agreed in the loan contract. The risk buffer 
position can be also calculated as present value of expected future payments failure. Estima-
tion of payments failure can be based on historical loss experience, solvency of the debtor, 
industry or market development etc. Every year the loans are reviewed and, if needed, addi-
tional provisions are set up (allocation to provisions). If the reasons for loan impairment 
cease, corresponding provisions are reversed. The annual change of the provisions in form of 
allocations and reversals are recognized in the income statement. In case the losses indeed 
occur, the partially or entirely unrecoverable claims are written-off, utilizing the established 
loan loss provisions (usage of provisions). Uncollectible loan amounts, for which no allow-
ances have been established, are written-down directly through the profit and loss account. 
Recoveries on claims previously written down are recognized through profit and loss. 
 
Latitude in estimation of future credit risks allows banks to manipulate the loan loss provi-
sions for income smoothing purposes. Banks determine higher amounts of provisions if they 
achieve higher operating profits. In case of week profits, banks tend to underestimate these 
provisions. This reporting behavior leads to more stable profits, but to higher differences be-
tween realized losses and expected ones. Cross-country empirical investigations support the 
income smoothing behavior of banks (see Laeven/Majnoni (2003), Bikker/Metzemakers 
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(2005)). However, factors as good investor protection and good accounting disclosure, high 
regulatory restrictions on bank activities and high bank supervision tend to reduce incentives 
for bank managers to smooth the profits (see Fonseca/González (2008)). 
 
In order to avoid possible income-smoothing distortions of listed European banks, appropriate 
adjustments to residual income have to be made. Computing the economic residual income, 
only incurred losses during the year in form of utilization of provisions and/or direct write-
downs through profit and loss are taken into consideration. This important information, inter-
estingly, has not been disclosed by many publicly-traded European banks. This lack of finan-
cial information has sharply narrowed the sample of banks, also limiting investigation to 27 




Figure 1: Loan loss provisions in income statement and balance sheet of a bank 
 
For the analysis, net income is adjusted by adding back the loan loss provisions (recognized in 




 – Provisions for possible loan losses  
 
… 
+ Allocation to provisions 
– Reversals of provisions 
















   Provisions at the beginning of the year 
 
+ Allocation to provisions 
– Reversals of provisions 
– Usage of provisions 
 
= Provisions at the end of the year 
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down claims. Since these adjustments are made on after-tax basis, the combined income tax 
rate of banks was used for calculations, that is disclosed in the annual reports. The adjusted 
book value of equity is increased by the balance sheet position of provisions for loan losses, 
which are net of incurred (but provided for) losses on the balance sheet date. The following 
formula presents the corresponding adjustments: 
 
(21) 
.provisions lossLoan  equity  of Book value 
),(1Recoveries      











The second adjustment is linked to deferred taxes, which are formed due to the temporary 
differences between the carrying amount of assets or liabilities and their taxable values.17 De-
ferred tax assets reflect the temporary differences in case the book value of assets (liabilities) 
is lower (higher) than their taxable values. These differences lead to possible reduction of tax 
payments in the period, when the assets are realized or the liabilities are settled. In the oppo-
site case, deferred tax liabilities are set up if occurred temporary differences are likely to in-
crease future taxes on income. Deferred taxes or liabilities are recognised either through profit 
and loss under taxes on income or directly in equity. Deferred taxes are charged or credited 
directly to equity, if they are based on subsequent valuations of assets or liabilities that are 
also directly recognised in equity (e.g., remeasurement of available for sale instruments). 
 
Deferred taxes do not represent current cash cost, they establish a kind of provisions for pos-
sible future cash payments. These non-cash tax positions can distort the actual realized rate of 
return on invested capital. Therefore, calculating the residual income, only current tax pay-
ments are taken into consideration. The adjusted equity is increased by deferred tax liabilities 
and is reduced by deferred tax assets. The deferred tax expense (income) must be added back 
to (subtracted from) net income: 
 
(22) 









                                                 
17
  For the accounting definition and treatment of deferred taxes see IAS 12.  
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The third common adjustment for banks, highlighted by Uyemura/Kantor/Pettit (1996), re-
gards non-recurring events such as restructuring charges. According to the argumentation of 
the authors, restructuring costs should be considered as disinvestments. Young/O’Byrne 
(2001, pp. 252−253) consider the issue, whether restructuring charges should be capitalized as 
investment for future success of a company. They argue that actually shutting down a plant 
should not extend its life and, therefore, future operating activity of the business. 
 
This adjustment should obviously reflect the economic, for each bank specific, aim of the 
restructure. In case of integrating processes after M&A deals, corresponding IT constructions, 
personnel reorganizations, and advisory services can not be interpreted as disinvestment activ-
ity, but the opposite. Reorganizational costs intended for divestment of no longer operational 
businesses present obviously disinvestments. In a high competitive world refocusing on busi-
ness operations with high added value, banks cease some previous activities. Following this 
strategy, they can achieve and can be able to hold higher performance in comparison to the 
situation without corresponding restructuring. In some cases, banks have to abandon their 
unprofitable parts of business, which may threaten the existence of a bank. These two exam-
ples have different economical meanings for banks. In the first case, the reorganization can be 
considered as a wise investment decision, the other situation mirrors a necessary disinvest-
ment policy. 
 
Thus, the reorganizational policy can not be standardly considered calculating the residual 
income. Some banks form also restructuring provisions.18 In this case adjustments should be 
similar to the loan loss provisions procedure: only used provisions must be taken into account. 
The critical point is whether it is possible from an external point of view to distinguish be-
tween the investment and disinvestment character of reorganization. Several banks from the 
sample explicitly report reasons for the restructuring. For example, integration of merged 
banks determines investment activity. However, downsizing due to cessation of activities or 
reorganizations due to centralization of back office functions can be disorienting in adjust-
ment decisions. Therefore, adjustments concerning restructuring costs can be subjective and 
misleading for the resulted residual income. 
 
                                                 
18
  These provisions should not be confused with provisions for restructuring costs that are set up for doubtful 
loans, which must be reclassified (restructured). These costs occur due to, e.g., renegotiation of contract 
terms, extending maturities of lending procedures etc.  
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The last bank-specific adjustment considers securities accounting. In literature, one can find 
that securities gains and losses are viewed as an earnings management device and, therefore, 
they should be excluded from NOPAT.19 However, trading is one of the core activities of 
banks. Trading result consists of all realized and unrealized gains and losses, dividend and 
interest income from trading portfolios. A good trading policy, also due to good securities 
selection, achieves positive trading income and boosts net income, what leads to better per-
formance. Strong negative trading results can also occur for different reasons, which is re-
flected in the net income reduction. Trading activity is a normal bank operating business, 
which results either in positive or negative figures, depending on achieved performance in the 
reporting year. Therefore, the residual income is not adjusted for securities accounting in this 
study. 
 
The next adjustment concerns purchased goodwill20 amortization that follows either straight-
line or immediate write-down policy.21 This accounting treatment does not reflect the true 
annual performance of a company.22 Previously, international accounting standards (IAS) 
required also straight-line amortization of goodwill over its useful lifetime. However, in 2005 
the reformulated IAS 3623 was adopted that requires an impairment approach of goodwill ac-
counting. According to this approach, value of goodwill must be at least annually reassessed 
and tested for impairment. Impairment loss is recognized in the income statement if the carry-
ing value of goodwill exceeds its recoverable amount. In order to carry out an impairment 
test, goodwill must be valued using the present value of estimated future cash flows. Forward-
looking market-based valuation is always a complex and challenging task. Thus, weaknesses 
concerning determination of discount rates, risk adjustments and cash flow estimation can 
occur during the implementation of impairment tests in companies (see Petersen/Plenborg 
(2010), Schultze/Weiler (2010)). Nevertheless according to IFRS, goodwill is not automati-
cally amortized, but looses its value only due to a justified impairment reason. This eliminates 
the reason for the corresponding residual income adjustment. 
 
Computing EVA, research and development (R&D) costs as intellectual capital must be capi-
talized.24 In case of the European banks, production costs for in-house development of soft-
                                                 
19
  See Uyemura/Kantor/Pettit (1996); Gross (2006), p. 63. 
20
  Purchased goodwill is defined as a surplus of price over a firm’s net asset value. 
21
  See Stewart (2008), pp. 114–115. 
22
  See Young/O’Byrne (2001), p. 238. 
23
  Reformulated IAS 36 was approved in 2004 by the IASB (International Accounting Standards Board). 
24
  See Stewart (2008), pp. 115–116; Young/O’Byrne (2001), pp. 210–211. 
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ware are already capitalized in accordance with IAS 38. No other development costs were 
recognized or disclosed in net income statements that can be used for an additional adjust-
ment. Fiordelisi (2007) takes also training costs into consideration as investment in human 
capital. Only several banks provide this information in annual reports, which limits the possi-
bility of computations. 
 
Empirical studies in banking25 consider also operating lease payments. These rental expenses 
do not appear on the balance sheet, though an operating lease is an equivalent of debt instru-
ment. In order to not understate total invested capital, the book value of capital must be in-
creased by the present value of future lease payments.26 Since the residual income computa-
tions are based on an equity-oriented framework, the present value of future lease payments 
does not affect the invested equity capital. Operating lease induces period expenses, which 
consist of interest lease payments and a repayment amount. Treating lease as a debt form of 
financing, repayment amounts should not be recognized in the income statement. But the ac-
quisition of assets, financed by operating lease, would cause additional depreciations in the 
income statement. Therefore, the net income must be adjusted by adding back repayment 
amounts and subtracting amortization amounts. These adjustments are offset assuming that 
the repayment and amortization amounts are equal. 
 
Thus, computing residual income, net income and equity book values are adjusted by loan 
loss provisions and deferred taxes: 
 
(23) adj1,adjadj NIRI −⋅−= ttEtt Br , 
 
.assets tax Deferred 
sliabilitie tax Deferred provisions lossLoan   equity of Book value 
, taxesDeferred)(1Recoveries




















Calculating residual income, the required rate of return on equity ( Er ) is needed. Shareholders 
invest in a company under condition to gain a specific level of the rate of return. This required 
                                                 
25
  See Fiordelisi (2007); Fiordelisi/Molyneux (2010a). 
26
  See Young/O’Byrne (2001), p. 248. 
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rate of return is called the cost of equity. The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) can be ap-
plied, in order to determine the required rate of return on equity.27 According to this model, 
the expected rate of return on a security i ( )( iRE ) depends on its level of systematic risk 
measured by the beta coefficient ( iβ ):28 
 
(24) ))(E()(E fMifi rRrR −⋅+= β , 
 fr  = Risk-free rate of return, 
 )(E MR  = Expected rate of return of the market portfolio. 
 
The difference between expected return of the market portfolio and risk-free rate of return is 
known as the market risk premium. The beta coefficient represents the coefficient of a linear 
regression of excess security on excess market return. The long-run market risk premium is 
estimated based on the average return of the Euro Stoxx 50 minus the average one-month 
Euribor from 1986 till 2006. The financial crisis time period is excluded from the market risk 
premium estimation, since capital markets then went down sharply resulting in a temporary 
negative risk premium. The beta coefficients (with respect to the Euro Stoxx 50) were taken 
from the Bankscope database for the year 2010 due to a stabilized stock price development 
during that year. Missing beta coefficients in the Bankscope database were self-calculated. 
Due to data limitations, it is assumed that the estimated beta coefficients are good proxies for 
systematic risk calculations. 
 
The estimated risk premium for every single bank (market risk premium multiplied by the 
bank’s beta coefficient) is assumed to stay constant. Though, the interest level, approximated 
by one-year Euribor, is taken into account to meet particularities in the bank valuation. The 
interest level changes the cost of equity year by year: 
 





                                                 
27
  See Damodaran (2006), p. 35. 
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Value creation measured by EVA concentrates on accounting figures. Fernandez (2002) in-
troduced a market-oriented determination of shareholder value creation. The company creates 
the value, if the achieved shareholder value added exceeds the required return on equity 
measured in market values:29 
 
(26)            uemarket valEquity )E( - added r valueShareholde  r valueshareholde Created ⋅= Er . 
 
Shareholder value added is defined as an increase in wealth of shareholders during the given 
period. This increase is not only provided by a positive difference of market price of equity, 
but also by dividends and other payments to shareholders. The formula for shareholder value 
added is presented as follows:30 
 
(27) 
.debentures econvertibl of Conversion
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Assuming that the adjusted share prices reflect all capital yields, created shareholder value 
(CSHV) per share can be presented as: 
 
(28) attEatatt PrPP 1,1 )(E)( CSHV −− ⋅−−= , 
aP  = Adjusted share price. 
 
Presenting created shareholder value not in absolute but in relative numbers leads to the ex-
cess shareholder return over the required rate of return to equity, which measures wealth crea-
tion performance: 
                                                 
29
  See Fernandez (2002), p. 9. 
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Estimating the required rate of return on equity with the CAPM model leads to the excess 





t rER −≡α . 
 
 
2.3 Risk Measures 
 
 
Also in measuring risk of banks, both market-oriented (volatility and probability of default) 
and accounting-based (Z-score and loan loss provisions) measures are used for the analysis in 
this thesis. At first, estimation of stock returns volatility (σ) is presented. After that, Z-score is 
described that measures distance to default. Here, different Z-scores are calculated using ei-
ther accounting data or market prices. Subsequently, the probability of default is described 
based on Merton’s model. Additionally, loan loss provisions, as banks’ internal credit risk 
estimations, are used for the analysis presented in Chapters 4 and 5. 
 
 
Volatility of Stock Returns 
 
 
The standard deviation of stock returns (σ ) is estimated using monthly stock data. For the 
regression analysis (presented in Chapters 4 and 5), annualized volatility is used for each year 
observation. Stock price data were mostly obtained from Bankscope database. The missing 
data were provided from corresponding stock exchanges, where the banks were listed. 
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The Z-score,32 as a popular risk measure associated with a bank’s probability of failure, is 
widely spread in empirical banking literature.33 Defining bank insolvency as a state in which 


























E ROA)ROA(ROAobPrPr)(obPr pipi , 
 
denoting ROA as a ratio of profit over assets (A), and f(ROA) is a probability density function 
of ROA. 
 
As shown by Roy (1952), if the return on assets (ROA) is a random variable with given mean 
value ROAµ  and standard deviation ROAσ , the Bienaymé-Tchebycheff inequality implies the 



































the upper bound of the probability of default can be rewritten as: 34 
 
                                                 
32
  This measure should not be confused with the Z-score, developed by Altman (1968). Altman’s Z-score 
aggregates five weighted financial ratios of a linear discriminant function, which assesses bankruptcy poten-
tial of a company. 
33
  See, e.g., Barry/Lepetit/Tarazi (2011); Bannier/Behr/Güttler (2010); Foos/Norden/Weber (2010); Houston et 
al. (2010); Laeven/Levine (2009); Lepetit et al. (2008); Boyd/Graham/Hewitt (1993). 
34






















Thus, the higher Z-score value corresponds to the lower probability of insolvency. 
 


























In this case, the Z-score specifies the number of standard deviations of the return on assets 
below its expected value so that equity is just absorbed, resulting in the bankruptcy of a 
bank.36 The Z-score, as a measure of distance to default, shows a higher value in case of a 
lower probability of default. 
 
The application of this risk measure is relatively simple, since only accounting data are 
needed for the calculations. However, it is also possible to use the market-oriented Z-score as 
in studies of Boyd/Graham/Hewitt (1993) and Iannotta/Nocera/Sironi (2007). They estimate 
market profits as stock price changes, adjusted for stock splits and dividends. The market 
value of assets corresponds to the sum of market value of equity and book value of total debt. 
 
In this study, the Z-score is determined using accounting data for net income, equity, and val-
ue of assets. In order to estimate the mean and standard deviation of return on assets (µROA 
and σROA), the time period from 2004 till 2009 is used. Following Laeven/Levine (2009) due 
to high skewness of the Z-score, a log-transformed Z-score is used for the regressions in 
Chapters 4 and 5. 
 
                                                 
35
  See Boyd/Graham (1988) and Boyd/Graham/Hewitt (1993). 
36
  See Boyd/Graham (1988), Hannan/Hanweck (1988), Boyd/Graham/Hewitt (1993). 
 36
Additionally, market-oriented Z-scores (ZM) are determined following Boyd/Graham/Hewitt 
(1993) and Iannotta/Nocera/Sironi (2007). Here, the mean and standard deviation of return on 
assets are estimated based on the monthly stock price data. The market-oriented return on 






















where D denotes the book value of liabilities and sN is the number of shares outstanding. The 
market equity-to-assets ratio − additionally needed to compute ZM according to the formula 

























The availability of monthly data for debt book values and the number of shares outstanding 
limits the computation of market-oriented Z-scores. Therefore, the calculations assume con-
stant figures during the year. During the financial crisis, historical data led to deep negative 
estimated annual returns on assets. In these cases, Z-scores became negative so that a log-
transformation was impossible. Hence, ZM was calculated based on monthly data. 
 
 
Probability of Default  
 
 
The probability of default is derived from Merton’s (1974) debt pricing model, based on 
Black/Scholes’ (1973) option pricing theory. In the model, the total value of a company (V) is 
assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion: 
 
(38) VdWVdtdV VV σµ += , 
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where Vµ  is the expected continuously compounded return on total company’s assets (V), Vσ  
is the firm value volatility and W  is a standard Wiener process. Under the assumption of one 
issued zero bond with maturity T and face value D, the total market value of a company must 
be sufficient to bear the full credit payment D on the maturity date. Thus, the equity value of a 
company (E) at maturity T can be presented as the difference between the total firm value and 
the repayment credit value. In case of a negative difference, a company defaults: 
 
(39) { }0;max DVE TT −= . 
 
Therefore, the firm’s equity corresponds to a call option on its assets with a strike price equal 
to the promised debt repayment D (see Figure 2). Applying Black/Scholes’ (1973) valuation 
formula for call options, the equity of a firm can be determined as: 
 
(40) )(N)(N 210 deDdVE Trf ⋅⋅−⋅= ⋅− , 
 































Tdd V ⋅−= σ12 , 
 
rf denotes the risk-free rate, continuously compounded in this model, and N(.) is the cumula-
tive standard normal distribution function. 
 
For the further calculations the value of assets V0 is needed. Since it is not directly observable, 
it can be calculated from formula (40) applying the market capitalization for E and the book 
value of debt for D. The problem is that 1d  is a function of asset volatility Vσ , which can be 
determined only with given values of V. 
 
Jones/Mason/Rosenfeld (1984) showed that under Merton’s model assumptions, the standard 













The change in value of equity (call option) with respect to asset price (underlying value) 
changes is defined by delta, which in Black/Scholes’ (1973) formula corresponds to )(N 1d . 










Figure 2: Payoff diagram of equity and debt value of a firm (Merton’s (1974) model) 
 
Solving equations (40) and (42) simultaneously leads to the values of V0 and Vσ .37 For the 
calculations, the annualized equity volatility is used based on monthly stock returns. As a 
proxy for risk-free rate, one-year Euribor is applied, and a one-year period for the time to ma-
turity is used in the calculations.38 
 
                                                 
37
  For this approach see, e.g., Bharath/Shumway (2008). 
38
  This simplification can be justified by large portions of demand deposits and savings on the liabilities side 
of banks, which are payable on a daily basis or on short-term notice. Therefore, these deposits compensate 
long-term deposits. The assumption corresponds to the common default forecasting horizon of one year; see, 




Value of equity, ET 
D 
Value of debt, DT 
 39
According to Merton’s (1974) model, a company defaults if the value of its assets ( TV ) is less 
than the face value of a zero bond (D) on debt maturity date (T) – representing the entire lia-
bilities of the regarded company (see Figure 3). The probability of default is given by: 
 
(43) )ln(lnobPr)(obPr DVDV TT <=< . 
 
Since the value of the assets follows a geometric Brownian motion, applying Ito’s lemma 

















































Replacing infinitesimal time interval dt by TTt =−=∆ 0  and dW by 
TTT WWWW =−=− 00 , also Vd ln by 0lnln VVT −  gives: 
 

























σµ  and variance TV2σ . The probability of default can be rewritten as: 
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Figure 3: Probability of default according to Merton’s (1974) model 
 
Possible paths of the company‘s log value 
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 measures the distance to default, since it gives the number of 
standard deviations 
D
V0ln  has to deviate from its mean so that default occurs.40 
 
In order to calculate the probability of default for European banks, the expected return on as-
sets Vµ  is needed. It was estimated using the leverage-effect that gives a linear relationship 





















The cost on equity Er  is calculated applying the CAPM, the cost on debt Dr  is determined as 
interest expenses divided by total interest bearing debt. 
 
Merton’s (1974) model implies many limitations of credit pricing, like one issued bond, no 
coupon payments, constant interest rates, and no consideration of the default before maturity. 
There are possibilities to improve this model, which many researches already have done.42 
Though, the empirical tests do not support the outperformance hypothesis of improved struc-
tural models43 compared to Merton’s (1974) model (see, e.g., Eom/Helwege/Huang (2004), 
Schaefer/Strebulaev (2008)). This model also outperforms the popular accounting-based 
probability of default measures, namely, Altman’s (1968) Z-Score and Ohlson’s (1980) O-
Score (see Hillegeist et al. (2004)). 
 
The empirical studies show that Merton’s distance to default does not entirely explain the 
credit risk exposure (see Hillegeist et al. (2004), Bharath/Shumway (2008)). However, the 
                                                 
40
  See Vassalou/Xing (2004). 
41
  Note that )( 2dN −  using the notation of formula (40) only represents the so-called risk-neutral PD. To 
receive the actual PD in formula (47), the corresponding distribution function has to be shifted from mean 
fr to mean Vµ . This is done by the help of the leverage effect to estimate Vµ  based on observable cost of 
equity. 
42
  See, e.g., Geske (1977); Kim/Ramaswamy/Sundaresan (1993); Shimko/Tejima/Van Deventer (1993); Long-
staff/Schwartz (1995); Collin-Defresne/Goldstein (2001). 
43
  The models of Geske (1977), Longstaff/Schwarzt (1995), Collin-Defresne/Goldstein (2001) etc. 
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model has predictive power in default forecasting (see Duffie/Saita/Wang (2007), 
Bharath/Shumway (2008)). Therefore, numerous empirical studies apply this model to meas-
ure bond market values, a company’s distance to default, and default probabilities. 44 
 
In empirical investigations of banks, a traditional credit risk measure is based on the account-
ing value of loan loss provisions or non-performing loans.45 Only several studies capture the 
risk with Merton’s (1974) model (see Lepetit et al. (2008), Koutsomanoli-
Filippaki/Mamatzakis (2009) and Fiordelisi/Marques-Ibanez/Molyneux (2011)). Merton’s 
(1974) model incorporates important forward-looking information from the stock prices. 
Moreover, it takes leverage and volatility information into account, which are crucial default 
determinants (see Koutsomanoli-Filippaki/Mamatzakis (2009)). The study of Fiorde-
lisi/Marques-Ibanez/Molyneux (2011) used expected default frequency (EDF), which is based 
on commercial implementation of Merton’s (1974) model by Moody’s KMV.46 
 
 
Loan Loss Provisions 
 
 
Loan loss provisions divided by total loans are used as an additional measure of credit risk. 
These provisions reflect expected future losses, which occur due to the default risk in the 
lending business. The value of this position is generally determined as the difference between 
the carrying value (book value) of an asset and the present value of the expected future re-
payments from the borrower. An estimation of payment failure can be based on historical loss 
experience, solvency of debtor or industry, and market development. Latitude in the estima-
tion of future credit risk allows banks to manipulate loan loss provisions. Therefore, the real-
ized loan losses are also used for a robustness check of the results. Realized losses are deter-
mined by direct loan write-downs and/or utilization of provisions. Here, also the recoveries on 
already written-off claims are taken into consideration. 
 
An overview of the described performance and risk measures is presented in Table 2. These 
measures are used as dependent variables in the subsequent regression analysis. This allows 
                                                 
44
  For recent studies see, e.g., Lepetit et al. (2008); Koutsomanoli-Filippaki/Mamatzakis (2009); Glaser/Müller 
(2010); Fiordelisi/Marques-Ibanez/Molyneux (2011). 
45
  See, e.g., Berger/DeYoung (1997); Kwan/Eisenbeis (1997); Altunbas et al. (2007); Iannotta/Nocera/Sironi 
(2007); Lepetit et al. (2008); Barry/Lepetit/Tarazi (2011); Fiordelisi/Marques-Ibanez/Molyneux (2011). 
46
  See Crosbie/Bohn (2003). 
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an estimation and comparison of efficiency and a corporate governance impact on market-




R  Average stock return σ Volatility of stock returns 
α Jensen’s alpha PD Probability of default 
q Tobin’s q ZM Market-oriented Z-score 
M/B Market-to-book ratio   
Accounting-based 
RIadj Adjusted residual income over adjusted book value of equity Z Accounting-based Z-score 
  LLP Loan loss provisions over total loans 
 




3 Data and Summary Statistics 
 
 
3.1 Performance and Risk Factors  
 
 
The empirical investigations of this thesis focus on publicly traded commercial banks from 27 
European countries between 2004 and 2009. To guarantee the quality of the analysis, the re-
quired financial data was mostly hand-collected directly from the banks’ financial statements. 
To eliminate differences in accounting standards, annual financial statements reported under 
the IFRS were considered. Thus, only listed banks were involved in the study, which have 
disclosed their annual reports under IFRS at least since 2005. Since the sample consists of a 
group of financial companies, consolidated financial statements were used. 
 
Country Percentage Country Percentage 
Austria 5.4% Lithuania  1.4% 
Belgium 1.4% Luxembourg 1.4% 
Cyprus 2.7% Malta 1.4% 
Czech Republic 1.4% Netherlands 1.4% 
Denmark 4.1% Norway 1.4% 
Finland 1.4% Poland 9.5% 
France 6.8% Portugal 4.1% 
Germany 12.2% Romania  2.7% 
Greece 6.8% Slovakia 2.7% 
Hungary 1.4% Spain 9.5% 
Ireland 2.7% Sweden 4.1% 
Italy 2.7% Switzerland 4.1% 
Latvia 1.4% Unighted Kingdom 5.4% 
Liechtenstein 1.4%   
 
Table 3: European countries involved in the study 
 45
The market information was taken from the Bankscope database. Missing stock prices were 
obtained from the corresponding stock exchanges, where the banks are listed. Insufficient 
financial and market information narrowed the sample to 444 observations (74 observations 
per year). As shown in Table 3, the data comprises 24 countries of the European Union (EU) 
plus Switzerland, Liechtenstein and Norway. The number of analyzed banks varies across 
countries from nine till one, where Germany has the highest share of 12.2 percent in the sam-
ple. 
 















d R  0.17 0.26 0.28 −0.07 −0.52 0.67 
α 0.11 0.20 0.19 −0.15 −0.59 0.62 
q 1.07 1.09 1.16 1.14 1.00 1.01 





















0.17 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.44 0.63 
PD [%] 0.01 0.09 0.11 2.36 3.93 7.24 










d Z 26.16 26.35 25.89 25.38 23.53 27.66 
LLP 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
 
Table 4: Cross-sectional average performance and risk figures for the period 2004–2009 
 
Summary statistics for the performance and risk measures are reported in Table 4. The finan-
cial crisis between 2007 and 2008 is associated with the performance deterioration, where a 
sharp decline in performance was observed in 2008. In the year 2009, banks on average show 
an increasing performance compared to the previous year. The annual return and Tobin’s q 
reflect a positive trend between 2004 and 2006. Taking the cost of capital into consideration, 
the residual income and Jensen’s alpha showed performance reductions already in 2006. 
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The volatility shows an increasing trend over the sample period. The probability of default 
also increases during the period of examination. Z-scores, however, reflect a higher risk dur-
ing the years 2007 and 2008, but the risk decreases in 2009 according to this measure. The 
increased risk during the crisis, displayed by the market-oriented Z-score, is much higher then 
reported by the accounting-oriented Z-score. 
 
 
3.2 Efficiency Analysis 
 
 
In this thesis, the DEA methodology is used to evaluate the relative efficiency of the banks in 
terms of its utilization of the input for the output generation. The overall, allocative, technical, 
pure technical and scale efficiency are measured applying production as well as intermedia-
tion approaches. Additionally, the Malmquist index and its components are computed to pro-
vide a clearer picture of the basic sources of productivity changes over time. The descriptive 
statistics of the input and output factors and corresponding prices over the years 2004-2009 
are given in Tables 5 and 6, respectively. 
 
As shown in Section 2.1, DEA models can be implemented either assuming an input reduc-
tion (input-oriented model) or an output augmentation (output-oriented model). Moreover, 
there is the option to assume either CRS, or VRS. In order to measure the cost efficiency of 
the banks, model (5) is used employing both production and intermediation approaches. In 
addition to decompose the result of cost efficiency (CE) into input allocative efficiency (IAE), 
input pure technical efficiency (IPTE) and input scale efficiency (ISE), both the CCR and the 
input-oriented BCC models (models (1) and (2), respectively with input orientation) have to 
be used. 
 
Similarly, the revenue efficiency (RE) of the banks is measured by model (7) in both produc-
tion and intermediation frameworks. Subsequently, the result of the revenue efficiency can be 
decomposed into output allocative efficiency (OAE), output pure technical efficiency (OPTE) 
and output scale efficiency (OSE). Therefore, both the CCR and the output-oriented BCC 
models (models (1) and (2), respectively with output orientation) have to be applied. More-
over, the profit efficiency (PE) of the banks in both production and intermediation framework 
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can be measured by model (9). All efficiency measures and their components applied in this 
thesis as independent variables are summarized in Figure 4. The development of input, output 
factors and their prices over time is summarized in Tables 5 and 6, respectively. 
 
CE (cost efficiency) = TE × IAE
RE (revenue efficiency) = TE × OAE
PE (profit efficiency)
MI (Malmquist index) = TEC × TC
TE (technical efficiency) = ISE × IPTE
TE (technical efficiency) = OSE × OPTE
IAE (input-oriented allocative efficiency)
OAE (output-oriented allocative efficiency)
ISE (input-oriented scale efficiency)
OSE (output-oriented scale efficiency)
IPTE (input-oriented pure technical efficiency)
OPTE (output-oriented pure technical efficiency)
TEC (technical efficiency change) = SEC × PTEC
(I/O)SEC (input/output-oriented scale efficiency change)













                                                 
47
  For the decomposition of efficiency measures see Cooper/Seiford/Tone (2007), pp. 258–272; for the de-
composition of the Malmqist index in the DEA framework see Färe et al. (1992) and Färe et al. (1994). 
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics of inputs and outputs. 
Number of Employee 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Minimum 23.00 42.00 60.00 131.00 236.00 236.00 
Maximum 135502.00 144900.00 152909.00 163126.00 197100.00 192000.00 
Mean 22549.04 24371.45 26715.04 28905.42 31884.58 30450.89 
Standard Deviation 33625.45 36863.94 39704.04 42997.23 48032.13 47678.24 
       
Fixed Assets 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.74 0.75 0.77 
Maximum 24296.03 27181.09 28537.10 27483.75 20523.70 22897.66 
Mean 1603.35 1780.55 1862.64 1970.55 1925.83 2134.72 
Standard Deviation 3420.34 3856.63 4135.02 4257.56 3776.76 4228.79 
       
Equity 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Minimum 18.52 25.27 30.84 58.82 58.75 69.79 
Maximum 49573.65 55222.00 63266.00 70002.00 69000.00 80344.00 
Mean 6584.84 8242.80 9636.01 10625.81 10003.12 12912.17 
Standard Deviation 10952.03 13441.34 15187.60 17051.93 16071.55 20284.02 
       
Debt Instrument 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.45 5.18 
Maximum 699368.53 824070.53 861129.37 938442.00 1473072.16 981451.63 
Mean 53148.94 76261.34 91244.26 109150.20 135765.39 106377.11 
Standard Deviation 122136.04 168492.01 189527.70 227655.38 311697.15 211732.86 
       
Loans 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Minimum 74.15 107.46 62.82 92.24 562.12 402.87 
Maximum 578362.61 709546.18 820184.49 1422770.63 1036075.28 919343.12 
Mean 79378.29 95033.10 111120.84 132695.93 129618.54 142451.98 
Standard Deviation 126213.31 149958.64 172443.27 228549.24 211729.35 224872.56 
       
Deposits 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Minimum 108.26 51.60 43.64 80.96 433.80 388.70 
Maximum 542773.37 659307.64 770728.54 1349900.28 918074.98 847826.48 
Mean 81439.27 97077.42 109330.40 127352.90 124202.89 128796.81 
Standard Deviation 130312.42 153866.61 171376.88 221663.11 193711.69 200263.81 
       
Financial Assets 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Minimum 4.98 8.00 20.68 38.31 39.12 24.39 
Maximum 917508.41 1094078.24 1211121.28 1107058.84 1521360.41 1075996.00 
Mean 69384.95 99624.10 112326.24 127381.44 139443.68 112290.02 
Standard Deviation 160697.86 223000.91 247963.69 279675.89 319744.84 228303.17 
       
Net Commission Income 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Minimum 3.05 3.38 7.03 8.18 9.32 8.32 
Maximum 11973.34 13769.27 15226.00 18457.55 15390.66 11920.05 
Mean 1255.93 1421.30 1687.09 1880.48 1690.68 1699.52 
Standard Deviation 2297.81 2626.13 3066.54 3409.62 2958.01 2920.39 
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics of input and output prices. 
Number of Employee 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Minimum 0.0090 0.0086 0.0074 0.0133 0.0147 0.0135 
Maximum 0.1786 0.2159 0.2445 0.1840 0.1885 0.7213 
Mean 0.0558 0.0594 0.0618 0.0617 0.0564 0.0695 
Standard Deviation 0.0349 0.0412 0.0439 0.0380 0.0323 0.0845 
       
Fixed Assets 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Minimum 0.0000 0.0000 0.0486 0.0554 0.0423 0.0487 
Maximum 0.5324 0.7095 1.0403 0.5438 0.5925 0.5711 
Mean 0.1796 0.1803 0.1864 0.1793 0.1676 0.1623 
Standard Deviation 0.0964 0.1060 0.1207 0.0701 0.0740 0.0723 
       
Equity 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Minimum 0.0243 0.0291 0.0410 0.0481 0.0312 0.0132 
Maximum 0.1181 0.1230 0.1348 0.1420 0.1250 0.1070 
Mean 0.0638 0.0687 0.0805 0.0877 0.0707 0.0527 
Standard Deviation 0.0207 0.0207 0.0207 0.0207 0.0207 0.0207 
       
Debt Instrument 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Minimum 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 0.0001 
Maximum 0.3456 0.4719 0.6660 0.9716 0.1866 0.2508 
Mean 0.0450 0.0413 0.0435 0.0588 0.0476 0.0400 
Standard Deviation 0.0499 0.0573 0.0768 0.1120 0.0341 0.0386 
       
Loans 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Minimum 0.0028 0.0020 0.0030 0.0030 0.0035 0.0042 
Maximum 0.1916 0.1370 0.1050 0.1083 0.3767 0.1650 
Mean 0.0490 0.0474 0.0477 0.0548 0.0668 0.0499 
Standard Deviation 0.0278 0.0220 0.0192 0.0166 0.0454 0.0247 
       
Deposits 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Minimum 0.0021 0.0028 0.0021 0.0050 0.0020 0.0016 
Maximum 0.0593 0.0544 0.0704 0.0918 0.0935 0.0825 
Mean 0.0220 0.0225 0.0254 0.0319 0.0352 0.0236 
Standard Deviation 0.0118 0.0097 0.0107 0.0126 0.0135 0.0152 
       
Financial Assets 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Minimum 0.0023 0.0003 0.0035 0.0023 0.0020 0.0010 
Maximum 0.3362 0.7827 0.6446 0.3889 0.3714 0.1753 
Mean 0.0495 0.0539 0.0563 0.0556 0.0613 0.0450 
Standard Deviation 0.0550 0.1009 0.0902 0.0585 0.0629 0.0391 
       
Net Commission Income 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Minimum 0.0000 0.0072 0.0076 0.0083 0.0083 0.0088 
Maximum 0.4658 0.4209 0.7928 0.3974 0.2030 0.4535 
Mean 0.0557 0.0591 0.0684 0.0666 0.0545 0.0566 
Standard Deviation 0.0622 0.0609 0.0978 0.0635 0.0449 0.0613 
       
 50
The cross-sectional average values of efficiency scores according to the production and in-
termediation models are presented in Tables 7 and 8, respectively. The production model (see 
Table 7) shows that the analyzed European banks experienced a decreasing trend in cost, rev-
enue and profit efficiency from 2004 to 2008. The intermediation model (see Table 8) shows 
different results. Here, the efficiency scores decreased gradually in 2005 and subsequently 
increased before falling back by the end of the observation period. 
 







CE 0.62 0.59 0.58 0.50 0.39 0.53 
     TE 0.84 0.81 0.78 0.76 0.74 0.76 
          ISE 0.94 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.87 0.89 
          IPTE 0.89 0.88 0.85 0.83 0.85 0.87 
     IAE 0.73 0.72 0.75 0.66 0.53 0.70 
RE 0.75 0.71 0.65 0.59 0.55 0.61 
          OSE 0.93 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.86 0.87 
          OPTE 0.90 0.90 0.86 0.84 0.86 0.88 
     OAE 0.88 0.86 0.82 0.76 0.73 0.78 
PE 0.68 0.64 0.58 0.54 0.47 0.52 
 
Table 7: Cross-sectional averages of cost, revenue and profit efficiency (CE, RE, and 
PE) and their components in the production approach 
 
 
Table 8: Cross-sectional averages of cost, revenue and profit efficiency (CE, RE, and 
PE) and their components in the intermediation approach 







CE 0.79 0.76 0.78 0.81 0.79 0.74 
     TE 0.93 0.90 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.91 
          ISE 0.97 0.94 0.97 0.97 0.95 0.93 
          IPTE 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.98 0.98 
     IAE 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.87 0.86 0.82 
RE 0.83 0.81 0.81 0.82 0.80 0.78 
          OSE 0.96 0.94 0.96 0.97 0.95 0.93 
          OPTE 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.98 0.98 
     OAE 0.89 0.89 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.86 
PE 0.78 0.69 0.70 0.72 0.74 0.71 
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The average development of cost, revenue, and profit efficiency and their components accord-
ing to the production model are presented in Figure 5. Here, one can see a decreasing trend in 
cost, revenue and profit efficiency from 2004 to 2008. The technical efficiency declined 
gradually from 2004 to 2008 and was followed by a steady increase in 2009. The input alloca-
tive efficiency has a volatile character with an increasing trend in 2006 and a decreasing char-
acteristic during the crisis. The cost, revenue and profit efficiency scores improve clearly in 
2009. 
 
Cross-sectional averages of efficiencies
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Figure 5: Cross-sectional averages of efficiencies in the production approach 
 
Regarding the results represented in Table 8, the trends for the cost, revenue and profit effi-
ciency in the intermediation approach are illustrated in Figure 6. This figure presents that the 
trends for the cost, revenue and profit efficiency of the analyzed European banks were gener-
ally the same but with slightly varying slopes. Here, efficiency scores decreased gradually in 
2005 and subsequently increased before falling back by the end of the observation period. The 
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Figure 6: Cross-sectional averages of efficiencies in the intermediation approach 
 
The Malmquist index generally compares technologies between periods. In the DEA frame-
work, it can be used to analyze sources of productivity changes over time. According to 
Färe/Grosskopf/Lindgren/Roos’ (1992) decomposition, the Malmquist index breaks down 
into efficiency change (EC) and technological change (TC). The EC measures the change in 
technical efficiency of banks between two periods. The TC measures technological improve-
ment between two periods, i.e., a shift in the efficient frontier. Regarding 
Färe/Grosskopf/Norris/Zhang’s (1994) decomposition, pure technical efficiency change and 
scale efficiency change can be input- (IPTEC, ISEC) or output-oriented (OPTEC, OSEC).48 
The pure technical efficiency change measures the managerial effort between two periods. 
The scale efficiency change reflects scale improvement between two periods. The input or 
output orientation of efficiency change calculation does not influence the Malmquist index. 
The corresponding cross-sectional results for the production and intermediation approach are 






                                                 
48
  See, again, the overview in Figure 1. 
 53
 
Table 9: Cross-sectional averages of the Malmquist index (MI) and its components in 
the production approach 
 
 
Table 10: Cross-sectional averages of the Malmquist index (MI) and its components in 
the intermediation approach 
 
 
Figures 7 and 8 identify the effects of the major components, efficiency and technological 
change, on the result of the Malmquist index based on the production and intermediation ap-
proaches. As presented in Table 9 and depicted in Figure 7, the selected European banks ex-
perienced a negative growth in productivity of −1.2 percent in the period 2004−2005, which 
was followed by −3.3 percent in 2005−2006. However, productivity showed a sudden in-
crease (+2.2 percent) in 2006−2007. Despite the productivity growth remained positive (+0.5 
percent) in the next period (2007−2008), it experienced a negative growth from 2006−2007 
until 2007−2008. In addition, the negative growth continued and the productivity growth rep-
resented −3.2 percent between 2008 and 2009. 
 











MI 0.988 0.967 1.022 1.005 0.968 
     TEC 0.971 0.964 0.969 0.983 1.054 
          ISEC 0.980 1.005 0.989 0.948 1.029 
          IPTEC 0.993 0.965 0.981 1.037 1.025 
          OSEC 0.976 1.014 0.990 0.945 1.030 
          OPTEC 0.995 0.955 0.980 1.043 1.026 
     TC 1.016 1.004 1.062 1.027 0.927 











MI 0.990 1.003 0.978 0.972 0.944 
     TEC 0.971 1.030 1.006 1.002 0.987 
          ISEC 0.975 1.030 1.005 0.977 0.978 
          IPTEC 0.997 1.000 1.002 1.027 1.009 
          OSEC 0.976 1.031 1.004 0.978 0.979 
          OPTEC 0.997 0.999 1.002 1.025 1.008 
     TC 1.019 0.974 0.972 0.972 0.957 
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Cross-sectional averages of efficiency changes
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Figure 7: Cross-sectional averages of efficiency changes in the production approach 
 
According to the intermediation model results given in Table 10 and shown in Figure 8, the 
productivity changes were almost negative. An exception accrued just in 2005−2006 with 
+0.3 percent. Besides, the trend was almost decreasing over time. The same development in 
the efficiency change is observed. It experienced a positive growth in 2005−2006. Further-
more, technology had a negative growth and a decreasing trend over time. 
 
Cross-sectional averages of efficiency changes
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Figure 8: Cross-sectional averages of efficiency changes in the intermediation approach 
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4 Efficiency and Performance of Banks 
 
 
4.1 Incremental Information Test  
 
 
Since empirical results concerning EVA superiority are not consistent, it will be assessed 
whether the adjusted residual income has more content information compared to the non-
adjusted residual income in the sample. Applying the equity-based residual income, adjust-
ments are correspondingly equity-oriented. All from an external point of view possible resid-
ual income adjustments were made as discussed in Section 2.2. In contrast to previous inves-
tigations in banking, the data is hand-collected allowing a high quality of results. 
 
In order to compare the explanatory power of adjusted and non-adjusted residual incomes in 



















































where the performance measures ( RI  and adjRI ) are deflated by the equity market value of 
the previous period, and ε  is the idiosyncratic error term. The summary statistics of the de-
pended and independent variables are reported in Table 11, and the correlation coefficients of 
the independent variables in the regressions are presented in Table 12. 
 
The Hausman (1978) test is run to assess the assumption of no correlation between unob-
served heterogeneity and regressors. According to the results obtained (see Table 13), the 
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generalized least square (GLS) fixed effect model49 is applied in case of an unadjusted resid-
ual income and a random effect technique50 is used with adjusted performance parameters. 
Implementing the Wooldridge (2002) test strongly rejects the null hypothesis of no first-order 
autocorrelation (see Table 13). Therefore, the robust to autoregressive disturbance 



































Mean 0.091 0.064 0.034 0.024 0.048 
Median 0.015 0.046 0.040 0.044 0.049 
SD  0.570 0.208 0.114 0.214 0.110 
 
Table 11: Descriptive statistics on the dependent and independent variables in the incre-































 ― ― 0.407 0.000 
 
Table 12: Correlations between independent variables in the incremental information test 
 
Table 13 presents the corresponding regression results. In case of an unadjusted residual in-
come, only the lag dependent variable is significant. The overall R2 of the regression with an 
adjusted residual income shows higher value (7.62 percent) compared to the non-adjusted 
parameters (3.46 percent). These results imply that adjusted residual incomes have higher 
explanatory power of stock rates of return. Therefore, the adjusted residual income is applied 
for further regression analysis. 
 
                                                 
49
  See Baltagi (2011), pp. 306−307. 
50
  See Baltagi (2011), pp. 308−310. 
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Coeff. -0.0489 -2.5208*** 0.8187*** -0.9855*** 
Within R2 0.1114 0.0974 
Between R2 0.0051 0.0001 
Overall R2 0.0346 0.0762 
Wald 2χ -statistics 9.15*** 24.24*** 
Hausman 2χ -statistics 12.07*** 3.16 
Wooldridge F-statistics 9.78** 4.42** 
 
Table 13: Regression results for the incremental information test 
 
 




Estimating efficiency, the production and the intermediation approaches are applied. Within 
the production model banks are treated as operating units that provide products and services 
to their clients. The intermediation model considers the intermediary function of banks in the 
economy. At first, it will be tested whether these two models obtain significantly different 
results. Afterwards, the significant influences of the efficiency scores on performance and risk 
parameters will be analyzed. 
 
Table 14 shows the differences between the non-periodic efficiency scores measured by pro-
duction and intermediation models. In all-year observations, the intermediation approach 
yields significantly higher efficiency scores compared to the production model. Only two ob-
servations of profit efficiency in 2005 and 2006 do not indicate significant differences. These 
results confirm the findings of Drake/Hall/Simper (2009), who compared, however, only pure 
technical efficiency scores of these two models. In case of periodic efficiency changes, more 





Table 14: Average differences of efficiency scores based on the production model and the 
intermediation model (***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1 %, 5 % and 
10 % level, resp.) 
 
 
Table 15: Average differences of efficiency change scores based on the production model 
and the intermediation model (***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1 %, 5 
% and 10 % level, resp.) 
 
Thus, the production and intermediation models obtain significantly different efficiency 
scores for banks, especially in single-year efficiency measurement.51 In the following section, 
it will be assessed, whether efficiency explains capital market performance, shareholder value 
                                                 
51
  Note, that higher efficiency scores do not necessarily support superiority of the intermediation model. For 
example, the intermediation model efficiency scores from Table 5 apparently do not reflect the slump of the 
financial crisis. Instead, the quality of the model can be evaluated based on its explanatory power; see Sec-
tion 4 on this. 








−0.072*** −0.060*** −0.082*** −0.105*** −0.093*** −0.081*** 
     TE 
−0.088*** −0.076*** −0.119*** −0.156*** −0.162*** −0.127*** 
          ISE 
−0.098*** −0.113*** −0.078*** −0.166*** −0.278*** −0.118*** 
          IPTE 
−0.146*** −0.153*** −0.157*** −0.261*** −0.343*** −0.199*** 
     IAE 
−0.021** −0.023** −0.043*** −0.060*** −0.079*** −0.051*** 
RE 
−0.061*** −0.048*** −0.076*** −0.099*** −0.086*** −0.073*** 
          OSE 
−0.020** −0.037*** −0.059*** −0.121*** −0.139*** −0.083*** 
          OPTE 
−0.088*** −0.090*** −0.147*** −0.225*** −0.241*** −0.171*** 
     OAE 
−0.035*** −0.038*** −0.053*** −0.069*** −0.090*** −0.064*** 
PE 
−0.078*** −0.043 −0.073 −0.141*** −0.226*** −0.191*** 











MI 0.018 0.010 
−0.039*** 0.052*** −0.030*** 
     TEC 0.016 
−0.051*** −0.048*** −0.001 0.054*** 
          ISEC 0.020 
−0.025** −0.027*** 0.026* 0.017 
          IPTEC −0.003 0.061 −0.099*** 0.055*** −0.071*** 
          OSEC 0.019 
−0.034*** −0.027*** 0.029*** 0.021 
          OPTEC −0.002 −0.021* −0.021*** −0.024** 0.037*** 
     TC −0.005 −0.012 −0.020*** −0.025** 0.035*** 
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4.3 Efficiency Influence on Performance of Banks 
 
 
In this section, it will be empirically tested, whether efficiency changes influence the risk and 
performance of banks. At first, the differences in the efficiency effect on market oriented and 
accounting performance and risk factors will be analyzed. Secondly, the results of the produc-
tion and intermediation approaches will be compared. Thirdly, the efficiency scores will be 
decomposed in their main elements to investigate the main performance and risk drivers of 
European banks. The following general regression equations are formulated to do the afore-
mentioned analysis:  
 
,Change EfficiencyePerformanc
,1,,10, tittiti εββ +⋅+= −  
(50)  
.Change EfficiencyRisk
,1,,10, tittiti εββ +⋅+= −  
 
The regression analysis consists of cross-sectional and time-series observations, where sub-
script i denotes individual banks (i=1,…,74), and t stands for a time period (t=2005,…,2009). 
The parameter ε  represents the idiosyncratic error term. In order to take not only current pe-
riod efficiency scores but also the efficiency of the previous year into consideration, a lagged 
efficiency variable can be included in the regression. Due to high correlation of efficiency 
scores of two consecutive periods (see Table 16 and 17), the change of efficiency between 




 CEt-1 TEt-1 ISEt-1 IPTEt-1 IAEt-1 REt-1 OSEt-1 OPTE t-1 OAE t-1 PE t-1 TC t-1 TEC t-1 IPTEC t-1 ISEC t-1 OPTEC t-1 OSEC t-1 MI t-1 
CEt 0.790***                 
TEt  0.882***                
ISEt   0.862***               
IPTEt    0.875***              
IAEt     0.620***             
REt 
     0.829***            
OSEt       0.847***           
OPTEt        0.854***          
OAEt         0.701***         
PEt          0.761
***
        
TCt           -0.018       
TECt            -0.173***      
IPTECt             0.123**     
ISECt              0.161***    
OPTECt               -0.093   
OSECt                -0.223***  
MIt                 -0.039 
 
Table 16: Pearson correlation coefficients of efficiency score and its lag variable within the production model (***, **, and * denote signifi-




Table 17: Pearson correlation coefficients of efficiency score and its lag variable within the intermediation model (***, **, and * denote signif-
icance at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, resp.) 
 
 
 CEt-1 TEt-1 ISEt-1 IPTEt-1 IAEt-1 REt-1 OSEt-1 OPTE t-1 OAE t-1 PE t-1 TC t-1 TEC t-1 IPTEC t-1 ISEC t-1 OPTEC t-1 OSEC t-1 MI t-1 
CEt 0.692***                 
TEt  0.631***                
ISEt   0.656***               
IPTEt    0.550***              
IAEt     0.675***             
REt      0.694***            
OSEt       0.667***           
OPTEt        0.535***          
OAEt         0.689***         
PEt          0.643
***
        
TCt           -0.052       
TECt            0.506***      
IPTECt             -0.490***     
ISECt              -0.347***    
OPTECt               -0.502***   
OSECt                -0.353***  




Since a panel data regression model is applied, the Hausman (1978) test is run to assess the 
assumption of no correlation between unobserved heterogeneity and regressors. Since the 
hypothesis could not be rejected, the generalized least square random effect (GLS RE) tech-
nique is used – controlling for an existing scale heteroscedasticity across panels and a serial 
correlation within panels.52 
 
The analysis starts with the influence of efficiency change on performance of banks, whereas 
the production and intermediation approaches are compared. The results of the regression 
analysis applied to the production model are presented in Tables 18 and 19. The overall R-
squared indicates that the cost-efficiency change has the highest influence on the capital mar-
ket performance of banks. Jensen’s alpha and stock returns are explained by cost-efficiency to 
16.68 percent and 16.39 percent, respectively. Both the input allocative efficiency and the 
technical efficiency play an important role for performance. However, only the scale effi-
ciency, as a component of technical efficiency, influences performance. Revenue efficiency is 
also significant, but with lower explanatory power (3.77 percent for Jensen’s alpha, 3.52 per-
cent for stock returns). Again, only scale efficiency and allocative efficiency play a significant 
positive role. Interestingly, input-oriented parameters show higher overall coefficients of de-
termination compared to output-oriented ones. Pure technical efficiency is insignificant for 
stock performance and Jensen’s alpha. This measure influences, however, Tobin’s q and mar-
ket-to-book ratio negatively. The EVA based shareholder value is only effected by profit effi-
ciency. Decomposing the Malmquist index, technical efficiency changes explain stock per-
formance, where the technological change stays insignificant for all performance measures. 
 
The intermediation approach has a strongly lower explanatory power to bank performance 
compared to the production model (see Tables 20 and 21). Only some efficiency components 
are significant, whereas pure technical efficiency, again, negatively influences Tobin’s q and 
market-to-book ratio. At the same time, input-oriented allocative efficiency change boosts 
these performance measures. 
 
The applied GLS RE technique ignores, however, a possible correlation between panels. The 
Pesaran (2004) test confirms cross-sectional correlation, which should be taken into consid-
eration. In order to combine heteroscedastic error terms across panels and correlated error 
                                                 
52
  Wooldridge (2002) and modified Wald test have confirmed the presence of cross-sectional heteroscedastic-
ity and serial correlation.  
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terms within and across panels, the feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) technique and 
the panel-corrected standard error (PCSE) linear regression can be applied. In case the num-
ber of periods is less than the number of panels (banks), the FGLS estimation can lead to in-
valid results.53 Therefore, the PCSE estimation is used to check the results obtained with the 
GLS RE regression. 
 
The comparison of the results is presented in Tables 22 and 23 for the production and inter-
mediation approach, respectively. In case of the production model, direction and significance 
of efficiency influence on performance almost mirror the previous findings. Within the inter-
mediation model, pure technical efficiency shows a slightly significant positive effect on 
stock returns and Jensen’s alpha. As previously discussed, an inverse relation between mar-
ket-to-book ratio and pure technical efficiency is observed. 
 
Summarizing the obtained results, the production approach superiorly explains the perfor-
mance of banks compared to the intermediation model. From this perspective, capital market 
participants view banks as production units considering deposits as an important part of their 
operating activities. Cost efficiency, compared to revenue efficiency, exhibits the strongest 
influence on market-oriented performance of banks in the analyzed sample. Profit efficiency 
does not possess, however, a strong effect on performance. Assessing the main components of 
cost and revenue efficiency indicates that scale and allocative efficiency drive the perfor-
mance of banks. Pure technical efficiency shows either no effect or a negative influence on 
performance. 
 
Analyzing the influence of efficiency on risk of banks (second equation of formulas (50)), the 
same statistical tests and regression techniques were run, which were applied in the perfor-
mance analysis. The results of the production model are reported in Tables 24 and 25. The 
figures show that pure technical efficiency increases volatility of the stock returns and the 
probability of default. It reduces the distance to default measured by Z-scores. These findings 
indicate that improvements in pure technical efficiency are accompanied by a higher risk tak-
ing of banks. 
 
                                                 
53
  See Beck/Katz (1995). 
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   CE∆      RE∆     PE∆  







































Coefficient 0.6241*** 0.5804*** 0.8919*** 0.2266 0.4810*** 0.3047** 0.7463** 0.3124 0.2630* 0.1114 
Within R2 0.1866 0.0211 0.0285 0.0008 0.1186 0.0322 0.0201 0.0030 0.0182 0.0120 
Between R2 0.0006 0.0669 0.0006 0.0906 0.0006 0.0678 0.0009 0.0801 0.0356 0.0026 
Overall R2 0.1639 0.0244 0.0228 0.0031 0.0991 0.0352 0.0175 0.0058 0.0197 0.0107 
α  
Coefficient 0.6365*** 0.6006*** 0.9237*** 0.2357 0.4888*** 0.3190** 0.7717** 0.3236 0.2777* 0.1162* 
Within R2 0.1922 0.0223 0.0287 0.0010 0.1216 0.0344 0.0203 0.0035 0.0195 0.0129 
Between R2 0.0000 0.0656 0.0001 0.0766 0.0023 0.0733 0.0038 0.0671 0.0430 0.0023 
Overall R2 0.1668 0.0256 0.0239 0.0033 0.1002 0.0377 0.0183 0.0061 0.0215 0.0114 
Tobin’s 
q 
Coefficient -0.0475 -0.3444 -0.6031 -0.1260*** 0.0190 -0.0979 -0.5353 -0.1274*** 0.0394 -0.0626 
Within R2 0.0042 0.0421 0.0478 0.0052 0.0013 0.0207 0.0412 0.0053 0.0503 0.0155 
Between R2 0.0030 0.0015 0.0016 0.0031 0.0127 0.0184 0.0025 0.0030 0.0222 0.0005 
Overall R2 0.0029 0.0174 0.0256 0.0013 0.0000 0.0042 0.0232 0.0014 0.0002 0.0083 
M/B 
Coefficient -0.5883 -3.0456 -4.5973 -1.4250*** -0.0238 -0.9069 -4.0205 -1.4909*** -0.4219 -0.6012* 
Within R2 0.0100 0.0480 0.0416 0.0093 0.0000 0.0243 0.0352 0.0101 0.0046 0.0223 
Between R2 0.0029 0.0052 0.0001 0.0050 0.0145 0.0200 0.0002 0.0053 0.0148 0.0016 







































Coefficient 0.0088 -0.0143 -0.0379 -0.0049 0.0132 0.0161 -0.0915 0.0293 0.0273 0.0199* 
Within R2 0.0013 0.0014 0.0018 0.0004 0.0039 0.0000 0.0119 0.0015 0.0011 0.0118 
Between R2 0.0006 0.0182 0.0002 0.0157 0.0091 0.2365 0.0041 0.0064 0.2270 0.0119 
Overall R2 0.0008 0.0000 0.0006 0.0003 0.0006 0.0150 0.0039 0.0020 0.0203 0.0098 
 
Table 18: Regression results of performance measures on efficiency changes according to the production model (∆ indicates a relative change 
of the respective efficiency measure from year t−1 to year t; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, resp.) 
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   MI       







































Coefficient 0.0666 -0.0484 0.5806*** 0.2272 0.8918*** 0.3124 0.7473** 
Within R2 0.0003 0.0025 0.0211 0.0008 0.0285 0.0030 0.0202 
Between R2 0.0466 0.0197 0.0669 0.0906 0.0007 0.0800 0.0009 
Overall R2 0.0017 0.0008 0.0244 0.0031 0.0228 0.0058 0.0176 
α  
Coefficient 0.0634 -0.0566 0.6009*** 0.2362 0.9236*** 0.3236 0.7726** 
Within R2 0.0002 0.0030 0.0223 0.0010 0.0287 0.0035 0.0203 
Between R2 0.0459 0.0194 0.0656 0.0765 0.0001 0.0671 0.0039 
Overall R2 0.0015 0.0010 0.0256 0.0033 0.0239 0.0061 0.0184 
Tobin’s 
q 
Coefficient -0.0188 0.0621 -0.3458 -0.1259*** -0.6026 -0.1275*** -0.5354 
Within R2 0.0003 0.0065 0.0421 0.0052 0.0477 0.0053 0.0415 
Between R2 0.0030 0.0011 0.0015 0.0031 0.0017 0.0030 0.0025 
Overall R2 0.0008 0.0020 0.0174 0.0013 0.0256 0.0014 0.0232 
M/B 
Coefficient 0.0453 0.7666 -3.0478 -1.4240*** -4.5936 -1.4904*** -4.0207 
Within R2 0.0001 0.0127 0.0481 0.0093 0.0415 0.0101 0.0353 
Between R2 0.0000 0.0001 0.0051 0.0050 0.0001 0.0053 0.0002 







































Coefficient -0.0110 -0.0111 -0.0142 0.0048 -0.0379 0.0293 -0.0913 
Within R2 0.0015 0.0011 0.0014 0.0004 0.0018 0.0015 0.0119 
Between R2 0.0012 0.0037 0.0183 0.0156 0.0002 0.0064 0.0041 
Overall R2 0.0013 0.0015 0.0000 0.0003 0.0006 0.0020 0.0038 
 
Table 19: Regression results of performance measures on efficiency changes according to the production model (Malmquist index decomposi-
tion; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, resp.) 
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   CE∆      RE∆     PE∆  







































Coefficient 0.0692 0.2946 0.4250 0.0863 0.1734 0.1234* 0.5588 0.1199 0.1252 0.0078 
Within R2 0.0000 0.0020 0.0017 0.0004 0.0003 0.0050 0.0030 0.0002 0.0030 0.0020 
Between R2 0.0577 0.0423 0.0281 0.0219 0.0175 0.0452 0.0428 0.0127 0.0486 0.0112 
Overall R2 0.0006 0.0034 0.0026 0.0009 0.0000 0.0073 0.0046 0.0004 0.0051 0.0007 
α  
Coefficient 0.0642 0.2848 0.3990 0.1735 -0.0065 0.1256** 0.5358 0.1187 0.1305* 0.0073 
Within R2 0.0000 0.0018 0.0013 0.0004 0.0003 0.0050 0.0025 0.0002 0.0030 0.0019 
Between R2 0.0603 0.0373 0.0296 0.0164 0.0199 0.0461 0.0449 0.0085 0.0551 0.0124 
Overall R2 0.0005 0.0031 0.0023 0.0009 0.0000 0.0074 0.0041 0.0004 0.0054 0.0006 
Tobin’s 
q 
Coefficient 0.0689 -0.0425 0.0116 -0.0593* 0.0929* 0.0081 0.0098 -0.0607 0.0179 -0.0019 
Within R2 0.0035 0.0004 0.0000 0.0004 0.0055 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0001 0.0001 
Between R2 0.0035 0.0001 0.0020 0.0008 0.0056 0.0132 0.0032 0.0014 0.0207 0.0004 
Overall R2 0.0008 0.0001 0.0001 0.0004 0.0011 0.0008 0.0001 0.0004 0.0016 0.0002 
M/B 
Coefficient 0.5495** -0.4501 1.0887 -1.1174* 0.7537** 0.1207 1.1678 -1.1790** 0.2796 -0.0166 
Within R2 0.0034 0.0007 0.0010 0.0026 0.0056 0.0001 0.0012 0.0028 0.0010 0.0002 
Between R2 0.0102 0.0016 0.0032 0.0000 0.0167 0.0158 0.0028 0.0000 0.0184 0.0002 







































Coefficient -0.0281 -0.0256 -0.0896 0.0089 -0.0253 0.0183 -0.0789 0.0036 0.0301** -0.0010 
Within R2 0.0045 0.0026 0.0056 0.0001 0.0023 0.0000 0.0049 0.0001 0.0012 0.0008 
Between R2 0.0011 0.0487 0.0046 0.0580 0.0043 0.3105 0.0129 0.0428 0.3029 0.0045 
Overall R2 0.0015 0.0001 0.0015 0.0015 0.0023 0.0201 0.0006 0.0003 0.0256 0.0000 
 
Table 20: Regression results of performance measures on efficiency changes according to the intermediation model (∆ indicates a relative 
change of the respective efficiency measure from year t−1 to year t; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % lev-
el, resp.) 
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   MI       







































Coefficient 0.1749 0.1333 0.2941 0.1727 0.4258 0.1194 0.5573 
Within R2 0.0051 0.0026 0.0020 0.0004 0.0017 0.0002 0.0030 
Between R2 0.0186 0.0002 0.0424 0.0219 0.0281 0.0127 0.0429 
Overall R2 0.0059 0.0023 0.0034 0.0009 0.0026 0.0004 0.0045 
α  
Coefficient 0.1711 0.1305 0.2845 0.1727 0.3999 0.1183 0.5342 
Within R2 0.0047 0.0025 0.0018 0.0004 0.0013 0.0002 0.0025 
Between R2 0.0177 0.0002 0.0374 0.0165 0.0297 0.0085 0.0449 
Overall R2 0.0055 0.0022 0.0031 0.0008 0.0023 0.0004 0.0041 
Tobin’s 
q 
Coefficient 0.0156 0.0337 -0.0426 -0.0598* 0.0125 -0.0612 0.0110 
Within R2 0.0004 0.0012 0.0004 0.0004 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 
Between R2 0.0067 0.0098 0.0001 0.0008 0.0021 0.0014 0.0032 
Overall R2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0004 0.0001 0.0004 0.0001 
M/B 
Coefficient 0.1318 0.3043 -0.4522 -1.1215*** 1.0951 -1.1827*** 1.1766 
Within R2 0.0003 0.0011 0.0007 0.0026 0.0010 0.0028 0.0028 
Between R2 0.0027 0.0058 0.0016 0.0000 0.0033 0.0000 0.0000 







































Coefficient 0.0116 0.0244 -0.0256 0.0090 -0.0899 0.0036 -0.0796 
Within R2 0.0012 0.0046 0.0026 0.0001 0.0056 0.0001 0.0050 
Between R2 0.0004 0.0203 0.0489 0.0581 0.0044 0.0428 0.0128 
Overall R2 0.0004 0.0004 0.0001 0.0015 0.0015 0.0009 0.0007 
 
Table 21: Regression results of performance measures on efficiency changes according to the intermediation model (Malmquist index decom-
position; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, resp.) 
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Table 24 also contains unexpected results concerning the allocative efficiency. The input-
oriented allocative efficiency shows a positive impact on volatility and a negative impact on 
the market-oriented Z-score. Additionally, it positively influences loan loss provisions. How-
ever, after controlling for cross-panel correlation, a significance of allocative efficiency influ-
ence on the mentioned risk measures disappears in the PCSE regression (see Table 26). 
 
The intermediation approach possesses a higher explanatory power of technical efficiency 
(components) for stock volatility and probability of default (see Tables 27 and 28). Again, 
there is a positive relation between the market-oriented risk and the pure technical efficiency. 
However, allocative efficiency and technological change drive the market-oriented risk reduc-
tion. These results imply that the ability to efficiently manage input quantities and output lev-
els is related to a higher asset volatility, which in turn is reflected in a higher equity volatility. 
The latter causes a reduction in stock prices, which can be recognized looking at Tobin’s q 
and the market-to-book value (see Tables 18 and 20). This negative effect is, however, com-
pensated by scale and allocative efficiency in case of purely market-oriented performance 
measures. 
 
Controlling for cross-panel correlation, loan loss provisions decrease with an increasing pure 
technical efficiency (see Table 29). Additionally, to exclude an income smoothing of banks, 
loan loss provisions are replaced by realized loan losses in terms of direct write-downs on 
loans and/or a utilization of corresponding provisions. The corresponding results show no 
evidence that the pure technical efficiency reduces the write-downs on loans (see Table 30). 
 
In order to check the robustness of the achieved results, several macroeconomic and bank-
specific control variables were included in the regression. It is controlled for the assets size 
(natural logarithm of assets), the financial structure (leverage), and the profitability of banks 
(return on equity). Income diversification is taken into account by the ratio of non-interest 
income over the net operating income. Macroeconomic variables include the (logarithm of) 
real GDP per capita and the inflation rate of the corresponding country. Conditioning on these 
additional bank characteristics and macroeconomic characteristics, the described results stay 





Table 22: Regression results (GLS RE and PCSE) of performance measures on efficiency changes according to the production model (∆ indi-
cates a relative change of the respective efficiency measure from year t−1 to year t, one plus ∆ corresponds to the efficiency change 





Market-oriented performance measures Accounting-based performance measure 
R  α Tobin’s q M/B RIadj 



















∆CE 0.6241*** 0.5873*** 0.6365*** 0.6008*** -0.0475 -0.0076 -0.5883 -0.1049 0.0088 0.0155 
     ∆TE / TEC 0.5805*** 0.5520* 0.6006*** 0.5754** -0.3444 -0.2028 -3.0456 -1.5466 −0.0143 -0.0224 
          ∆ISE / ISEC 0.8919*** 0.7565* 0.9237*** 0.7988* -0.6031 -0.2783 -4.5973 -1.6157 −0.0379 -0.0397 
          ∆IPTE / IPTEC 0.2266 0.2716 0.2357 0.2728 -0.1260*** -0.1235*** -1.4250*** -1.1463*** −0.0049 -0.0146 
    ∆IAE 0.4810*** 0.4105*** 0.4888*** 0.4194*** 0.0190 0.0359 -0.0238 0.2255 0.0132 0.0226 
∆RE 0.3047** 0.2524* 0.3190** 0.2686* -0.0979 -0.0620 -0.9069 -0.4722 0.0161 0.0462 
          ∆OSE / OSEC 0.7463** 0.6837* 0.7717** 0.7172* -0.5353 -0.2438 -4.0205 -1.3785 −0.0915 -0.0994 
          ∆OPTE / OPTEC 0.3124 0.3077 0.3236 0.3184 -0.1274*** -0.1209** -1.4909*** -1.1584** 0.0293 0.0292 
     ∆OAE 0.2630* 0.2063 0.2777* 0.2232 0.0394 -0.0242 -0.4219 -0.1711 0.0273 0.0462 
∆PE 0.1114 0.0971 0.1162* 0.1023 -0.0626 -0.0467** -0.6012* -0.3834*** 0.0199* 0.0282 
MI 0.0666 0.1257 0.0634 0.1223 -0.0188 -0.0253 0.0453 -0.0548 −0.0110 -0.0141 
     TC -0.0484 -0.0263 -0.0566 0.0175 0.0621 0.0186 0.7666 0.3435 −0.0111 -0.0113 
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Table 23: Regression results (GLS RE and PCSE) of performance measures on efficiency changes according to the intermediation model (∆ 
indicates a relative change of the respective efficiency measure from year t−1 to year t, one plus ∆ corresponds to the efficiency 








R  α Tobin’s q M/B RIadj 



















∆CE 0.0692 0.0164 0.0642 -0.0162 0.0689 -0.0073 0.5495** 0.2705 −0.0281 -0.0182 
     ∆TE / TEC 0.2946 0.3794 0.2848 0.3682 −0.0425 -0.0526* −0.4501 -0.2549 −0.0256 -0.0260 
          ∆ISE / ISEC 0.4250 0.4811 0.3990 0.4491 0.0116 0.0167 1.0887 1.0827 −0.0896 -0.0527 
          ∆IPTE / IPTEC 0.0863 0.2469 0.1735 0.2490 −0.0593* -0.0629* −1.1174* -0.8642*** 0.0089 -0.0103 
    ∆IAE 0.1734 -0.0840 −0.0065 -0.0878 0.0929* 0.0107 0.7537** 0.3998 −0.0253 -0.0122 
∆RE 0.1234* 0.1038* 0.1256** 0.1071* 0.0081 0.0140 0.1207 0.2657 0.0183 0.0201 
          ∆OSE / OSEC 0.5588 0.8059 0.5358 0.0106 0.0098 0.0120 1.1678 1.1009 −0.0789 -0.0362 
          ∆OPTE / OPTEC 0.1199 0.6377 0.1187 0.1796 −0.0607 -0.0668* −1.1790** -0.8976*** 0.0036 -0.0185 
     ∆OAE 0.1252 0.0951 0.1305* 0.1024 0.0179 0.0298 0.2796 0.4202* 0.0301** 0.0318 
∆PE 0.0078 0.0057 0.0073 0.0050 −0.0019 0.0160 −0.0166 -0.0001 −0.0010 -0.0009 
MI 0.1749 0.2547 0.1711 0.2493 0.0156 0.0132 0.1318 0.0135 0.0116 -0.0038 
     TC 0.1333 0.2228 0.1305 0.2180 0.0337 0.0179 0.3043 0.0421 0.0244 0.0033 
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   CE∆      RE∆     PE∆  






























 σ  
Coefficient 0.2578*** 0.4650** 0.1108 0.4569*** 0.1398** 0.1846* 0.0451 0.5252*** 0.0885 0.1110* 
Within R2 0.1238 0.0785 0.0033 0.0602 0.0303 0.0744 0.0008 0.0775 0.0170 0.0646 
Between R2 0.2165 0.0353 0.0050 0.0402 0.1201 0.0036 0.0039 0.0620 0.0043 0.0000 
Overall R2 0.1239 0.0693 0.0015 0.0558 0.0371 0.0556 0.0003 0.0734 0.0094 0.0457 
PD  
Coefficient 0.0737** 0.1753** 0.1280 0.1293 0.0301 0.0563 0.0808 0.1660** 0.0157 0.0455 
Within R2 0.0715 0.0736 0.0183 0.0326 0.0111 0.0430 0.0085 0.0525 0.0038 0.0614 
Between R2 0.0129 0.0004 0.0115 0.0000 0.0076 0.0063 0.0104 0.0007 0.0123 0.0029 
Overall R2 0.0491 0.0391 0.0065 0.0182 0.0090 0.0183 0.0026 0.0312 0.0000 0.0302 
MZ  
Coefficient -0.2949*** -0.6641*** 0.1002 -0.8131*** -0.1415 -0.2586** 0.2243 -0.8131*** -0.1308* -0.0125* 
Within R2 0.0225 0.0194 0.0003 0.0252 0.0047 0.0176 0.0013 0.0252 0.0038 0.0092 
Between R2 0.0335 0.0121 0.0015 0.0081 0.0122 0.0004 0.0004 0.0081 0.0004 0.0001 

































Coefficient 0.0270 -0.0984 0.0655 -0.1519* 0.0364 -0.0575* 0.0559 -0.1815** -0.0688 0.0109 
Within R2 0.0031 0.0055 0.0013 0.0115 0.0053 0.0105 0.0010 0.0165 0.0116 0.0011 
Between R2 0.0198 0.0393 0.0154 0.0185 0.0027 0.0062 0.0156 0.0340 0.0001 0.0189 
Overall R2 0.0003 0.0066 0.0009 0.0047 0.0000 0.0024 0.0008 0.0073 0.0006 0.0014 
LLP 
Coefficient 0.0048** -0.0019 0.0027 0.0027 0.0050** 0.0010 -0.0083 0.0019 0.0011 0.0009 
Within R2 0.0169 0.0007 0.0001 0.0001 0.0186 0.0007 0.0042 0.0001 0.0011 0.0011 
Between R2 0.0067 0.0064 0.0190 0.0190 0.0047 0.0017 0.0020 0.0145 0.0117 0.0004 
Overall R2 0.0081 0.0000 0.0017 0.0017 0.0087 0.0000 0.0007 0.0015 0.0002 0.0006 
 
Table 24: Regression results of risk measures on efficiency changes according to the production model (∆ indicates a relative change of the 
respective efficiency measure from year t−1 to year t; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, resp.) 
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   MI       






























 σ  
Coefficient -0.0154 -0.1159 0.4650** 0.4570*** 0.1116 0.5249*** 0.0455 
Within R2 0.0045 0.0375 0.0785 0.0602 0.0033 0.0774 0.0008 
Between R2 0.0367 0.0162 0.0353 0.0402 0.0049 0.0619 0.0038 
Overall R2 0.0003 0.0182 0.0693 0.0559 0.0015 0.0733 0.0003 
PD  
Coefficient 0.0158 -0.0175 0.1754** 0.1293 0.1282 0.1659** 0.0809 
Within R2 0.0047 0.0019 0.0736 0.0326 0.0183 0.0525 0.0085 
Between R2 0.0079 0.0098 0.0004 0.0000 0.0114 0.0007 0.0105 
Overall R2 0.0007 0.0031 0.0391 0.0182 0.0065 0.0311 0.0027 
MZ  
Coefficient 0.0889 0.2520* -0.6639*** -0.8133*** 0.0988 -0.9293*** 0.2240 
Within R2 0.0047 0.0182 0.0194 0.0253 0.0003 0.0330 0.0013 
Between R2 0.0202 0.0077 0.0121 0.0081 0.0016 0.0110 0.0004 
































Coefficient 0.0640 -0.0634 -0.0982 -0.1519** 0.0658 -0.1814** 0.0562 
Within R2 0.0127 0.0114 0.0055 0.0115 0.0013 0.0165 0.0010 
Between R2 0.0024 0.0023 0.0394 0.0185 0.0153 0.0341 0.0157 
Overall R2 0.0018 0.0000 0.0066 0.0047 0.0009 0.0073 0.0008 
LLP 
Coefficient -0.0013 -0.0014 -0.0019 -0.0027 0.0027 0.0019 -0.0082 
Within R2 0.0018 0.0018 0.0007 0.0009 0.0001 0.0001 0.0042 
Between R2 0.0152 0.0153 0.0064 0.0023 0.0193 0.0145 0.0021 
Overall R2 0.0003 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0017 0.0015 0.0007 
 
Table 25: Regression results of risk measures on efficiency changes according to the production model (Malmquist index decomposition; ***, 




Table 26: Regression results (GLS RE and PCSE) of risk measures on efficiency changes according to the production model (∆ indicates a rela-
tive change of the respective efficiency measure from year t−1 to year t, one plus ∆ corresponds to the efficiency change from the 
Malmquist index decomposition; R2 means overall R2; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, resp.) 
 
Risk 
Market-oriented risk measures Accounting-based risk measures 
σ PD MZ  Z  LLP 



















∆CE 0.2578*** 0.1935** 0.0737** 0.0706*** −0.2949*** -0.1560 0.0270 0.0662 0.0048** 0.0028 
     ∆TE / TEC 0.4650** 0.3731*** 0.1753** 0.1688*** −0.6641*** -0.4705** −0.0984 -0.1362 −0.0019 -0.0017 
          ∆ISE / ISEC 0.1108 0.1778 0.1280 0.1758*** 0.1002 0.0828 0.0655 0.0175 0.0027 -0.0012 
          ∆IPTE / IPTEC 0.4569*** 0.3384*** 0.1293 0.1055** −0.8131*** -0.6023** −0.1519* -0.1581 0.0027 -0.0005 
    ∆IAE 0.1398** 0.0916 0.0301 0.0310* −0.1415 -0.0278 0.0364 0.0800 0.0050** -0.0028 
∆RE 0.1846* 0.1571*** 0.0563 0.1468*** −0.2586** -0.1547 −0.0575* -0.0522 0.0010 -0.0019 
          ∆OSE / OSEC 0.0451 0.1288 0.0808 0.1241** 0.2243 0.1321 0.0559 -0.0144 −0.0083 -0.0107 
          ∆OPTE / OPTEC 0.5252*** 0.3965*** 0.1660** 0.1468*** −0.8131*** -0.6739** −0.1815** -0.1777 0.0019 0.0014 
     ∆OAE 0.0885 0.0671 0.0157 0.0102 −0.1308* -0.0331 −0.0688 -0.0522 0.0011 -0.0017 
∆PE 0.1110* 0.0849** 0.0455 0.0419*** −0.0125* -0.0659 0.0109 -0.0156 0.0009 -0.0005 
MI −0.0154 -0.0242 −0.0154 0.0212* 0.0889 0.0679 0.0640 -0.0431 −0.0013 0.0003 
     TC −0.1159 -0.1045** −0.0175 -0.0093 0.2520* 0.1983 −0.0634 -0.0132 −0.0014 0.0004 
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Purely market-oriented performance is still positively affected by the input-oriented scale and 
the allocative efficiency. An increasing pure technical efficiency causes a higher asset volatili-
ty and, hence, an increasing stock volatility. With respect to the shareholder value determined 
by adjusted residual income, results differ from the other performance findings. Here, output-
oriented pure technical and allocative efficiency influence the accounting-based shareholder 
value in a positive way. This indicates that the managers’ ability to improve pure technical 
efficiency is reflected in superior accounting figures (residual income and contrariwise loan 
loss provisions). In contrast, purely market-oriented performance is not driven by pure tech-
nical efficiency. 
 
If loan loss provisions are replaced by realized loan losses, the significant influence of the 
pure technical efficiency disappears. This, once more, supports the finding that pure technical 
efficiency is improved, accompanied by a higher asset risk. The latter does not occur in ac-
counting figures, but is incorporated in stock prices in terms of Tobin’s q and the market-to-
book ratio. With regard to the stock return and Jensen’s alpha, this effect interferes with scale 
efficiency. The main robustness check results are summarized in Table 30, where according to 
the direction, only significant results are denoted by a plus or minus sign. 
 
 
4.4 Summary of the Results 
 
 
This chapter analyzed the relation between efficiency on the one hand and performance and 
risk on the other hand of the listed European banks. The decomposition of overall efficiencies 
into their components allows a detailed analysis of the performance and the risk drivers of the 
European commercial bank industry in the period between 2004 and 2009. To guarantee the 
quality of the analysis, all accounting data was hand-collected from annual reports under the 
IFRS. Market-oriented and accounting-based measures were used as the dependent variables 
in the regression analysis to capture all possible influencing factors of efficiency on the per-




   CE∆      RE∆     PE∆  






























 σ  
Coefficient -0.0051 0.5380 -0.2972 0.8596*** -0.1601*** 0.0768 -0.2786 0.8679*** 0.0089 0.0099 
Within R2 0.0032 0.0430 0.0122 0.0982 0.0258 0.0143 0.0113 0.0979 0.0004 0.0056 
Between R2 0.0940 0.1316 0.0248 0.1142 0.0263 0.0061 0.0258 0.1140 0.0013 0.0021 
Overall R2 0.0000 0.0507 0.0054 0.0955 0.0118 0.0125 0.0047 0.0950 0.0001 0.0048 
PD  
Coefficient 0.0315 0.2922* 0.0793 0.3498** -0.0506** 0.0348 0.0781 0.3572** 0.0015 0.0115 
Within R2 0.0022 0.0964 0.0013 0.1082 0.0112 0.0202 0.0013 0.1100 0.0005 0.0382 
Between R2 0.0305 0.0573 0.0361 0.0245 0.0069 0.0013 0.0328 0.0264 0.0202 0.0254 
Overall R2 0.0047 0.0772 0.0037 0.0762 0.0038 0.0094 0.0036 0.0778 0.0002 0.0328 
MZ  
Coefficient 0.3893** -0.1050 1.3567 -0.8033*** 0.4731*** -0.0197 1.3378 -0.8069*** 0.0372 0.0013 
Within R2 0.0175 0.0000 0.0227 0.0126 0.0199 0.0002 0.0225 0.0126 0.0002 0.0000 
Between R2 0.0148 0.0127 0.0128 0.0024 0.0036 0.0000 0.0147 0.0017 0.0005 0.0001 

































Coefficient -0.0321 0.0261 -0.0063 0.0434 -0.0522 -0.0074 -0.0510 0.0630 -0.0212 0.0006 
Within R2 0.0010 0.0004 0.0000 0.0006 0.0025 0.0002 0.0002 0.0011 0.0024 0.0000 
Between R2 0.0330 0.0450 0.0361 0.0100 0.0084 0.0000 0.0408 0.0087 0.0024 0.0027 
Overall R2 0.0038 0.0032 0.0028 0.0004 0.0017 0.0000 0.0037 0.0003 0.0001 0.0005 
LLP 
Coefficient -0.0053* -0.1308 -0.0134 -0.0101 -0.0014 -0.0040** -0.0153 -0.0095 -0.0044* -0.0003 
Within R2 0.0077 0.0141 0.0073 0.0053 0.0005 0.0139 0.0089 0.0046 0.0108 0.0016 
Between R2 0.0160 0.0241 0.0816 0.0001 0.0025 0.0021 0.0739 0.0001 0.0001 0.0087 
Overall R2 0.0003 0.0010 0.0003 0.0020 0.0000 0.0027 0.0001 0.0017 0.0037 0.0028 
 
Table 27: Regression results of risk measures on efficiency changes according to the intermediation model (∆ indicates a relative change of the 
respective efficiency measure from year t−1 to year t; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, resp.) 
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   MI       






























 σ  
Coefficient 0.0167 -0.1319** 0.5386 0.8593*** -0.2971 0.8671*** -0.2774 
Within R2 0.0001 0.0129 0.0431 0.0982 0.0122 0.0978 0.0113 
Between R2 0.0328 0.0007 0.1315 0.1142 0.0245 0.1137 0.0260 
Overall R2 0.0003 0.0100 0.0507 0.0955 0.0054 0.0949 0.0047 
PD  
Coefficient 0.0582 0.0007 0.2924* 0.3497** 0.0792 0.3570** 0.0785 
Within R2 0.0200 0.0001 0.0965 0.1082 0.0013 0.1100 0.0013 
Between R2 0.0029 0.0046 0.0571 0.0245 0.0356 0.0263 0.0327 
Overall R2 0.0136 0.0000 0.0772 0.0762 0.0037 0.0778 0.0036 
MZ  
Coefficient 0.2049 0.3264*** -0.1065 -0.8028*** 1.3564 -0.8055*** 1.3364 
Within R2 0.0071 0.0103 0.0000 0.0126 0.0226 0.0125 0.0224 
Between R2 0.0065 0.0000 0.0127 0.0024 0.0128 0.0017 0.0148 
































Coefficient 0.0382 0.0446 0.0260 0.0431 -0.0060 0.0630 -0.0516 
Within R2 0.0026 0.0022 0.0004 0.0006 0.0000 0.0011 0.0002 
Between R2 0.0008 0.0141 0.0448 0.0099 0.0361 0.0085 0.0409 
Overall R2 0.0000 0.0018 0.0032 0.0004 0.0028 0.0003 0.0037 
LLP 
Coefficient -0.0028 -0.0006 -0.0131 -0.0101 -0.0134 -0.0095 -0.0153 
Within R2 0.0033 0.0001 0.0141 0.0053 0.0073 0.0046 0.0090 
Between R2 0.0088 0.0002 0.0240 0.0001 0.0815 0.0001 0.0731 
Overall R2 0.0001 0.0000 0.0010 0.0020 0.0003 0.0017 0.0001 
 
Table 28: Regression results of risk measures on efficiency changes according to the intermediation model (Malmquist index decomposition; 




Table 29: Regression results (GLS RE and PCSE) of risk measures on efficiency changes according to the intermediation model (∆ indicates a 
relative change of the respective efficiency measure from year t−1 to year t, one plus ∆ corresponds to the efficiency change from the 
Malmquist index decomposition; R2 means overall R2; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, resp.) 
 
Risk 
Market-oriented risk measures Accounting-based risk measures 
σ PD MZ  Z  LLP 



















∆CE −0.0051 0.0141 0.0315 0.0578 0.3893** 0.3569*** −0.0321 0.0650 −0.0053* -0.0067** 
     ∆TE / TEC 0.5380 0.4123** 0.2922* 0.2699*** −0.1050 -0.0368 0.0261 -0.0611 −0.1308 -0.0168*** 
          ∆ISE / ISEC −0.2972 -0.1466 0.0793 0.0818 1.3567 0.9195 −0.0063 0.0059 −0.0134 -0.0244 
          ∆IPTE / IPTEC 0.8596*** 0.6518*** 0.3498** 0.3198 −0.8033*** -0.5111** 0.0434 -0.0805 −0.0101 -0.0108*** 
    ∆IAE −0.1601*** -0.1502** −0.0506** -0.0395 0.4731*** 0.4353** −0.0522 -0.0586 −0.0014 -0.0017 
∆RE 0.0768 0.0719** 0.0348 0.0358*** −0.0197 -0.0006 −0.0074 -0.0066 −0.0040** -0.0062** 
          ∆OSE / OSEC −0.2786 -0.1446 0.0781 0.0383 1.3378 0.9219 −0.0510 -0.0151 −0.0153 -0.0257 
          ∆OPTE / OPTEC 0.8679*** 0.6640*** 0.3572** 0.3287*** −0.8069*** -0.6011*** 0.0630 -0.0051 −0.0095 -0.0104*** 
     ∆OAE 0.0089 0.0208 0.0015 0.0072 0.0372 0.5226** −0.0212 -0.0051 −0.0044* -0.0058** 
∆PE 0.0099 0.0082 0.0115 0.0096** 0.0013 0.0032 0.0006 -0.0012 −0.0003 -0.0005 
MI 0.0167 0.0158 0.0582 0.0582** 0.2049 0.1499 0.0382 -0.0033 −0.0028 0.0012 
     TC −0.1319** -0.1011* 0.0007 0.0071 0.3264*** 0.9207 0.0446 0.0129 −0.0006 0.0031 
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Table 30: Robustness check results with respect to macroeconomic and industry-specific 
variables (+ and − indicate significance with positive and negative influence, 
resp.; production model results for performance measures, intermediation mod-
el results for risk measures; RLL denotes realized loan losses over total loans) 
 
The impact of postulating the production or the intermediation model was also examined. 
Comparing efficiency scores shows that the intermediation model yields significantly higher 
figures compared to the production approach. Assessing the influence of efficiency on the 
performance and risk of banks, an evidence for superiority of the production model in ex-
plaining performance was found. Contrariwise, the intermediation model seems to superiorly 
predict risk. Market-oriented performance is mostly affected by cost efficiency. Allocative 
and scale efficiency are the main drivers for performance of banks. These results demonstrate 
that abilities to choose the right operating size and to manage competitive input and output 
prices lead to a superior performance in the banking industry. 
 
As a further important finding, the assessed sample of European banks shows that pure tech-
nical efficiency is associated with a higher asset risk. A higher asset risk is reflected in a high-
er stock volatility and, hence, causes lower market values. This implies that bank managers 
can improve the pure technical efficiency by taking more risk. This form of higher risk is not 




















∆CE + +      +  −  
     ∆TE / TEC + + − −   +     
          ∆ISE / ISEC + +          
          ∆IPTE / IPTEC   − −  + + −  −  
    ∆IAE + +    − − +    
∆RE + +   +     − − 
          ∆OSE / OSEC            
          ∆OPTE / OPTEC   − − + + + −  −  
     ∆OAE     +     − − 
∆PE   − −      − − 
MI            
     TC      −  +    
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ing seemingly lower credit risk, accounting-based residual income increases and loan loss 
provisions decrease with a higher pure technical efficiency. 
 
In contrast to previous studies, realized loan losses as a risk measure were also applied and 
calculated by the direct write-downs and utilization of loan loss provisions. Realized loan 
losses are not affected by pure technical efficiency. This, again, implies that managers are 
able to influence accounting information in this respect, whereas the capital market incorpo-








 Intermediation model shows higher efficiency scores 
 Production model superiorly explains performance 
 Intermediation model superiorly explains risk 
Scale efficiency  Improvement in market-oriented performance 
Allocative efficiency 
• Improvements in market-oriented performance 
 Risk reduction 
Pure technical efficiency 
• Market value reduction 
• Increase in risk 
 Accounting-based measures show opposite results 
Technological change  Risk reduction 
Scale efficiency change  Improvement in market-oriented performance 
Pure technical 
efficiency change 
 Market value reduction 
 Increase in risk 
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5 Corporate Governance and Performance of Banks 
 
 
The wave of corporate scandals within the last decades and the financial crisis of 2008 are the 
reasons of an increased attention to corporate governance in the recent research literature. 
Shleifer/Vishny (1997) define corporate governance as the way in which the suppliers of fi-
nance to corporations assure themselves a return on their investments. This separation of 
ownership and control is connected with the traditional agency theory, which assesses how 
the interests of the managers can be aligned with those of the shareholders. 
 
Recent studies investigate a variety of mechanisms that can improve corporate governance 
practices and, therefore, lead to higher shareholders’ wealth. Gompers/Ishii/Metrick (2003) 
construct an equally-weighted corporate governance index (G-index) that measures the level 
of shareholder rights restrictions. The G-index consists of 24 corporate governance provisions 
complied by the investor responsibility research centre (IRRC). The components of the index 
are provisions, which restrict hostile takeovers (e.g., poison pills, staggered board), limit 
shareholders’ voting rights (e.g., cumulative or supermajority voting), protect managers and 
directors from legal liability or job termination (e.g., golden parachutes, indemnification con-
tracts). There are also other provisions, which provide protection to managers and/or direc-
tors. The authors report that firms with stronger shareholder rights are more profitable, have a 
higher sales growth and a higher firm value. They also find positive excess returns for firms 
with strong shareholder rights over the period of 1990-1999. 
 
Bebchuk/Cohen/Ferrell (2009) analyze which provisions matter more for the firm value 
among the 24 provisions reported by the IRRC. They create the entrenchment index (E-
index), which is based on six provisions: four provisions limit shareholder rights and two en-
hance the resistance of hostile takeovers. The two aforementioned indices have been recently 
used in a substantial amount of research literature as measures of a firm’s corporate govern-
ance quality (see, e.g., Cremers/Nair (2005), Cremers/Nair/Wei (2007), Masulis/Wang/Xie 
(2007), Bhagat/Bolton (2008), Harford/Mansi/Maxwell (2008)). 
 
Board characteristics are also considered as important determinates of corporate governance. 
Board size (see Lipton/Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993)), board independence (see Herma-
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lin/Weisbach (1998)), stock ownership of board members (see Bhagat/Carey/Elson (1999)), 
and CEO power (see Hermalin/Weisbach (1998)) are the most popular determinants of corpo-
rate governance. Numerous empirical studies determine a positive relation between the good 
governance and the performance of companies. For instance, Durnev/Kim (2005) conduct a 
cross-country analysis, and Bhagat/Bolton (2008) concentrate on American companies. The 
evidence of corporate governance influence on performance is also documented in some 
European countries (Germany (see Goncharov/Werner/Zimmermann (2006)), Italy (see 
Abatecola/Poggesi (2010)), Ukraine (see Zelenyuk/Zheka (2006))), Asian countries (China 
(see Paskelian/Bell (2009), Barniv/Bao (2009)), Japan (see Sueyoshi/Goto/Omi (2010))), and 
Australia (see Henry (2008)). The results of already existing theoretical and empirical work 
regard the quality of corporate governance as a key performance driver of companies. Well-
governed firms guarantee the credibility of their financial and accounting reports and gain a 
higher market valuation (see Mir/Seboui (2008)). 
 
The impact of ownership structure on the performance of banks was investigated in different 
dimensions. Ownership concentration has a large positive influence on bank valuation, espe-
cially in countries with a weak legal protection of minority shareholders (see Ca-
prio/Laeven/Levine (2007)). The large shareholders, however, have greater incentives to in-
crease bank risk-taking (see Laeven/Levine (2009)). Privately owned banks seem to be more 
profitable than mutual and state-owned banks (see Iannotta/Nocera/Sironi (2007)). Privately 
owned banks observe different risk strategies in case when individuals, banks or institutions 
hold higher equity stakes (see Barry/Lepetit/Tarazi (2011)). 
 
However, the assessment of board characteristics and its influence on the performance of 
banks is scarce in literature. The studies of Andres/Vallelado (2008) and Belkhir (2009) ex-
amine the influence of several board characteristics on the valuation of banks, whereas Pathan 
(2009) analyzes the relevance of a board structure on bank risk-taking. In this thesis, the fur-
ther analysis is conducted investigating the influence of the board characteristics on the valua-
tion, the shareholder value creation and the risk level of banks. Board size, board independ-
ence, gender diversity and activity of boards are considered in the investigation. Committees 
and auditor’s quality are taken into consideration too. Characteristics of the CEO and the 
chairman of a board are additionally involved in the study. The ownership concentration of 
banks, as separate corporate governance instrument, is also taken into account. 
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5.1 Measurement of Corporate Governance  
 
 
Corporate boards are considered as an internal governance mechanism that is a focus of many 
theoretical and empirical investigations. The board of directors presents a control system, 
which hires, fires, assesses, and compensates executive managers. They ratify and monitor 
important management decisions that ensure the separation of management and control in a 
corporation (see Fama/Jensen (1983)). 
 
Analyzing European countries, it is important to mention that there are differences in the legal 
structures of the boards. As presented in Figure 9, there are three types of a board structure in 
Europe. Some countries have adopted only one possible board system; some countries allow 
firms to choose an appropriate structure for their governance (e.g., France, the Netherlands, 
Spain, Portugal). The unitary (one-tier board or monistic system) board of directors is used in 
common law countries and consists of executive and non-executive directors, who are nor-
mally elected by shareholders. The United Kingdom and Ireland adopt only the one-tier board 
system. 
 
The two-tier (dualistic) board system, prevailed in civil law countries, is compulsory in Ger-
many and Austria. According to the dualistic board structure, it is mandatory to have two 
boards: the management board (executive board) and the supervisory board. The supervisory 
board consists of shareholder representatives and up to 50 percent of labour representatives. It 
appoints, dismisses, advises, and supervises the board of managing directors. The manage-
ment board is responsible for managing the company and the development, and implementa-
tion of the company’s strategies. Thus, there is a clear separation between the functions and 
responsibilities of the boards. A simultaneous membership in the management and the super-
visory board is not permitted. 
 
The characteristic of the mixed board system is that the executive directors can be members of 
the non-executive board simultaneously. Additionally, the meetings of the executive and non-
executive boards are held separately, however, with the same chairman and CEO. This struc-
ture is widespread in numerous European countries, but is prevalent in Belgium, Portugal, and 
Sweden.54 
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Performance of banks depends on the advising, decision-making and monitoring quality of 
the board of directors. An effective monitoring and the advisory of boards presume a better 
governance of companies. Therefore, boards as an independent control mechanism can play 
an important role for the financial performance and market success of a company. The ques-
tion is what can the effectiveness of communication, coordination and decision making influ-
ence within the boards. Jensen (1993) argues that the board size influences the effectiveness 
of directors by monitoring the CEO’s actions. Because of high coordination costs and free-
riding problems, large boards are associated to be less effective in controlling managers than 
small boards. Thus, large boards make CEOs more powerful influencing the board’s deci-
sions. Jensen (1993) suggests that the optimal size of the board should be seven or eight peo-
ple. 
 
This theoretical argumentation leads to an empirical research that investigates the relationship 
between the board size and performance of companies. Yermack (1996) finds an inverse rela-
tion between the board size and Tobin’s q in a sample of large US industrial corporations. His 
evidence was supported by Eisenberg/Sundgren/Wells (1998), who analyze small and mid-
sized Finnish firms. Yermack (1996) reports that smaller boards lead to a higher likelihood of 
                                                 
55
  See Heidrick/Struggles (2011), p. 10. 
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CEOs’ dismissal due to poor performance, and that CEOs’ compensation is more dependent 
on performance in companies with smaller boards. Large sample differences in studies of 
Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg/Sundgren/Wells (1998) with a corresponding average board 
size of 12.25 and 3.7 members motivated Beiner et al. (2004) for the assessment of Swiss 
companies with a mean of 6.6 board members. Using the simultaneous equation approach, 
they do not find any significant relationship between the board size and firm valuation. 
 
Concerning the variability of corporate performance and value, Cheng (2008) reports a less 
volatile performance of companies with large boards. These findings can indicate that oc-
curred communication and coordination problems lead to more compromises in large boards 
in order to reach a consensus. This might result in less extreme board decisions, which is re-
flected in a less extreme corporate performance.  
 
However, the aforementioned studies do not take the complexity of firms into account. More 
complex firms with corresponding operations have larger information requirements. Since the 
board of directors ratify and monitor management decisions, complex firms tend to require 
larger boards for more advice (see Boone et al. (2007)). Thus, advices are more valuable the 
more complex a firm is. The theoretical framework of Adams/Hermalin/Weisbach (2008) 
assesses this issue. The authors denote the quality of advice from director i as ia  and assume 
that ia  is an independent and identically distributed random variable ( Fai
iid
~ ). Assuming that 
a monetary payoff of the director’s best advice to the CEO has a monetary payoff propor-
tional to
S
aimax , where S  stands for the simplicity level of the firm, the benefit from dN  
directors can be presented as:56 
 









Taking the cross-partial derivative of the equation (51) with respect to S  and dN  leads to: 
 










                                                 
56
  See Adams/Hermalin/Weisbach (2008). 
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Since the expectation of the maximum value is increasing in the number of draws, the equa-
tion (52) has a negative value. This means that the marginal benefit of additional directors is 
decreasing in the simplicity of the firm.57  
 
In the further analysis, Adams/Hermalin/Weisbach (2008) assess why the quality or amount 
of advice increases with the board size in complex firms. Monitoring complex firms could be 
more difficult compared to simple companies, which can lead to a higher number of monitors 
(directors). Suppose Sp is the independent probability that a given director detects an existing 
problem in a firm. The probability that no director from dN  board directors detects the prob-
lem is given by dNSp)1( − . Then, the probability that at least one director detects the problem 
is equal to dNSp)1(1 −− . The benefit of holding dN  directors is equal to the revenues from 
detecting the problem minus the cost of having dN  directors ( )( dNC ). Normalizing this dif-
ference, the benefit is determined as: 
 
(53) )())1(1( dN NCSp d −−− . 
 
Maximizing formula (53), a firm chooses an optimal number of directors. The cross-partial 
derivative of formula (53) with respect to S and dN  leads to: 
 
(54) pSpSpNpSp dd NdN )1log()1()1( 11 −−+− −− . 
 
Analyzing whether formula (54) has a positive or negative sign, formula (54) is divided by 















The presented inequality in (55) leads to negative values for Sp>0.632 or for large enough 
values of dN . This indicates that the marginal return of adding directors is declining in the 
simplicity level of the firm. Thus, it is optimal to have smaller boards for simple firms.58 
                                                 
57
  See Adams/Hermalin/Weisbach (2008). 
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Estimating the complexity of the firms with the number of segments, firm size (sales volume), 
and leverage, Coles/Naveen/Naveen (2008) empirically confirm a positive relation between 
the board size and the complexity level of companies. They also show that the relation be-
tween Tobin’s q and the board size differs for simple and complex firms. Simple firms have a 
negative relation between the market value and the number of directors; however, Tobin’s q is 
increasing in the board size for complex firms. The achieved results indicate that complex 





















Figure 10: Relation between board size and Tobin‘s q (see Coles/Naveen/Naveen (2008)) 
 
Analyzing the results of Coles/Naveen/Naveen (2008) suggests that, due to a high leverage 
and complexity, banks should benefit from larger boards. Studies of Andres/Vallelado (2008) 
and Belkhir (2009) assess this issue empirically. The sample of Andres/Vallelado (2008) con-
sists of banks with a one-tier board structure from six OECD countries (Canada, the US, the 
UK, Spain, France, and Italy). They investigate the influence of board size and the fraction of 
non-executive directors on Tobin’s q, return on assets, and the annual market return of bank 
shareholders. They confirm that there is a positive relation between bank size and perform-
ance of banks. However, they find an inverted U-shaped relation, i.e., adding an additional 
director to around 19 existing directors reduces the bank’s value. The authors conduct further 
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  See Adams/Hermalin/Weisbach (2008). 
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analysis answering the question whether this relation is driven by the board size or by the 
board composition. Regressing performance factors on the proportion of non-executive direc-
tors on the board, the results show again an inverted U-shaped relation between performance 
and the share of non-executives. These findings indicate that an optimum mix of executive 
and non-executive directors is important for the value creation of banks. 
 
Belkhir (2009) reports also a positive relation between the board size and Tobin’s q analyzing 
US banking organizations during the period 1995-2002. This relation is significant for both 
subsamples: savings and commercial banks. In contrast to Andres/Vallelado (2008), Belkhir 
(2009) does not find any quadratic relation between the board size and performance of banks. 
 
Pathan (2009) examines the relevance of board structure on risk-taking of US bank holding 
companies. His findings are consistent with the results obtained by Cheng (2008): large 
boards are associated with a lower variability of stock returns. The negative board size influ-
ence on risk of banks is confirmed by all five risk measures used in his study. This indicates 
that smaller boards are associated with a higher risk-taking behavior in banks. 
 
Several aforementioned studies that concentrate on the banking industry have assessed in 
most cases US banks. Nevertheless, three European countries were involved in the study of 
Andres/Vallelado (2008). In this thesis, further investigations are carried out with a sample of 
74 banks from 27 European countries. At first, it is analyzed whether there is a linear or quad-
ratic relation between the board size and performance in the European banking industry, since 
until now the results contradict concerning this issue (see Andres/Vallelado (2008) and 
Belkhir (2009)). Secondly, the executive and non-executive directors are considered sepa-
rately, in order to check the influence of board composition on the performance and risk of 
banks. 
 
The observed sample of banks has three types of board structures: unitary, two-tired and 
mixed boards. The board size is calculated as a sum of executive and non-executive directors. 
In the boards with the mixed structure, there are members who are both executive and non-
executive directors. Determining the complete board size, these members are counted only 
once. In the regression analysis, the natural logarithm of the board size, executive and non-







The board of directors, as a central internal governance mechanism, has to reduce the agency 
problems, which occur between the shareholders and the management. Outsiders (independ-
ent directors) have clear incentives to monitor the executives in an effective way. Also, ad-
vices provided by outside directors can be better due to their valuable experience, expertise 
and important connections (see Fama/Jensen (1983), Hermalin/Weisbach (1988), 
Linck/Netter/Yang (2008)). This argumentation implies the importance of board independ-
ence for a successful governance of companies. However, insider representation is also im-
portant for companies due to their firm-specific knowledge (see Fama/Jensen (1983), Raheja 
(2005), Coles/Naveen/Naveen (2008)). 
 
Several empirical studies assess the possible link between the board independence and per-
formance of a firm. It is, however, not straightforward to compare the definitions of inde-
pendence used in the literature. Some studies define outsiders as non-executive directors, who 
are independent from managers (see Andres/Vallelado (2008), Linck/Netter/Yang (2008)). 
Numerous studies distinguish between three types of directors: inside directors, affiliated out-
side directors and non-affiliated outside (independent) directors. Inside directors are board 
members who are current or former officers (full-time employee) of a company. The affiliated 
outside (“gray”59) directors are those who have a business relation with the company (e.g., 
bankers and lawyers), and those who have a family relationship with the officers of the firm. 
The independent (non-affiliated) outside directors are all other outside directors without an 
aforementioned affiliation. With this structure, there are, nevertheless, differences in director 
definitions. For instance, Belkhir (2009) and Bhagat/Black (2001) consider former employees 
of a company as affiliated outside directors. In contrast, Yermack (1996) and Booth/Deli 
(1999) treat former employees as insiders in their studies. Figure 11 summarizes definitions of 
board members used in several studies. 
 
Empirical results concerning the board independence and its influence on performance of 
companies are mixed. Bhagat/Black (2001) do not confirm the hypothesis that a higher pro-
portion of independent directors on the board is associated with a better firm performance. 
Coles/Naveen/Naveen (2008) conduct further analysis defining affiliated and independent 
directors as outsiders. Their findings indicate that complex firms gain from more outsiders, 
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  Yermack (1996). 
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which implies that more complex firms have a greater need for advice and expertise relative 
to simple firms. The authors hypothesize that R&D intensive firms need more firm-specific 
knowledge to select appropriate strategies. Their results show that in high-R&D firms Tobin’s 
q is positively related to the insiders’ proportion on the board. 
 
Analyzing US holding companies, Belkhir’s (2009) results do not show any significant influ-
ence of board independence on the performance of banks. Pathan (2009) analyzes whether a 
fraction of independent directors influences the risk-taking behavior of banks. He reports a 
negative relation between independent boards and risk measures of banks. More conservative 












Outside directors (Yermack (1996))
Unaffiliated outsiders (Booth/Deli (1999))
Independent directors (Bhagat/Black (2002))
Independent members (Boone et al. (2007))
Independent outside directors (Belkhir (2009))
Independent directors (Pathan (2009))
Gray directors (Yermack (1996))
Affiliated outsiders (Booth/Deli (1999))
Affiliated directors (Bhagat/Black (2002))
Affiliated outside directors (Belkhir (2009))
Inside directors (Yermack (1996))







Figure 11: Definitions of directors 
 
In order to determine the fraction of independent directors on the board, the number of non-
affiliated directors divided by the total number of non-executive directors is considered. Most 
of the banks disclose information concerning the board independence in their annual reports. 
Some of the banks, however, do not provide this information. Therefore, the board independ-
ence variable can not be used for the whole sample of banks in the regression analysis. For the 
complete sample of banks, the dummy variable is used, which indicates whether banks dis-
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close this information or not. Afterwards, the sample is narrowed and the influence of the ex-






The board gender diversity is another corporate governance aspect that gains greater attention 
for companies as well as shareholders. The proponents for governance reform promote the 
importance of gender diversity on the boards. They argue that diversity improves the board’s 
effectiveness and recommend appointing more female directors (see Higgs (2003), Tyson 
(2003)). Diversity in boards can generate improved brainstorming and creativity, which leads 
to more alternative solutions of the problems (see Hillman/Shropshire/Cannella (2007)). Also 
not belonging to the “old boys club”, female directors can correspond better to the concept of 
independent directors (see Adams/Ferreira (2009)). 
 
Worldwide the companies are under the pressure to increase female presence on the boards. 
Several European countries have introduced legal requirements for female board seats. The 
average statistics of the percentage of women on boards in 2010 is presented in Table 32 for 
several European countries. Here, Norway has the highest average female quota on the 
boards, since it was the first country which introduced board gender requirements already in 
2005. In Norway since January 2008, all listed companies must have a 40 percent female rep-
resentation on the boards. Until 2015, Spain has to increase the female quota to 40 percent 
and the Netherlands to 30 percent. In France, the proportion of women should not be below 
40 percent for the listed companies, and also for the non-listed firms with revenues or total 
assets over 50 million euro or employing at least 500 persons for three consecutive years.60 
 
This legislative pressure is based on the view that the presence of women on boards can im-
prove the governance of firms. Adams/Ferreira (2009) investigate this hypothesis analyzing 
whether gender diversity influences the director attendance behaviour, committee assign-
ments, CEO turnover, and compensation. Based on Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500, S&P Mid-
Caps and S&P SmallCap firms in the period of 1996-2003, they find that gender diversity has 
a significant influence on the board’s attendance. At first, women seem to have less atten-
dance problems than men. Secondly, this reduces attendance problems of male directors. 
                                                 
60
  For legal requirements see Deloitte (2011). 
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These results indicate that the higher the share of female directors, the better is the attendance 
behavior of the board members. The study also provides evidence, that the likelihood to be 
assigned to audit, nominating, and corporate-governance committees of women is higher then 
of men. The authors report that the CEO turnover for poor performance increases with the 
female presence on the boards. 
 
Country 
Number of listed companies 
rated by GMI 
Average percentage of women 
on boards 
Austria 19 7.73 
Belgium 26 6.75 
Czech Republic 3 5.56 
Denmark 26 14.40 
Finland 27 23.41 
France 103 9.47 
Germany 90 10.46 
Greece 24 8.53 
Hungary 4 6.45 
Ireland 16 9.14 
Italy 56 3.42 
Netherlands 30 13.70 
Norway 23 34.25 
Poland 12 7.37 
Portugal 11 1.82 
Spain 46 7.96 
Sweden 49 23.89 
Switzerland 51 9.19 
UK 405 8.46 
 
Table 32: Average percentage of women on boards in European countries in 201061 
 (GMI = governance metrics international) 
 
Gul/Srinidhi/Ng (2011) find that board gender diversity in the US listed companies improves 
stock price informativeness by an increasing firm-specific voluntary information disclosures. 
The authors examine this effect also separating the sample in firms with weak and strong cor-
                                                 
61
  See GovernanceMetrics International (2010). 
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porate governance. The results show that the relation between gender diversity and stock price 
informativeness is only significant for firms with weaker corporate governance. This suggests 
that firms can improve a firm-level weak governance by appointing female directors.  
 
Promoting a better attendance behavior and a tougher monitoring of management lead to im-
provements in the board governance. Stronger governance should affect firm performance and 
the shareholder wealth of companies. Carter/Simkins/Simpson (2003) find a positive relation 
between gender and ethic diversity of the board and firm value for the Fortune 1000 compa-
nies. However, too much monitoring can lead to a breakdown in communication between 
managers and directors, which could have a negative influence on the shareholder value (see 
Almazan/Suarez (2003), Adams/Ferreira (2007), Adams/Ferreira (2009)). Adams/Ferreira 
(2009) confirm empirically that on average tough boards with gender diversity do not im-
prove the firm value. This relation differs in firms with different levels of shareholder rights, 
measured by Gompers/Ishii/Metrick’s (2003) governance index. Gender diversity on boards 
has a positive influence on shareholder value in companies with weak shareholder rights, 
where additional monitoring enhances performance. In firms with strong governance, greater 
gender diversity can lead to overmonitoring, which reduces the firm value. 
 
There is no evidence of gender diversity impact on the performance in the European banking 
industry. Therefore, the influence of female board presence on the performance of European 
banks is analyzed in this thesis. The percentage of female non-executive directors out of all 
non-executive directors is considered. Also, the percentage of female executive directors out 






It is not straightforward to assess the way boards operate. However, the board meeting fre-
quency could be an important attribute of board operations. On the one hand, the board meet-
ing time is an important mechanism to improve the effectiveness of monitoring function (see 
Conger/Finegold/Lawler (1998)). Since a higher frequency of meetings can be linked to a 
more detailed control of managers, meetings can be associated with a greater shareholder 
wealth (see Andres/Azofra/Lopez (2005)). On the other hand, meeting time can not be spent 
for the meaningful exchange of ideas and, therefore, is used not in an efficient way (see 
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Vafeas (1999)). Also, the fixed agenda by chief executive officers and routing tasks absorb 
opportunities of non-executive directors to exercise an effective control over management 
(see Jensen (1993), Vafeas (1999)). 
 
Jensen (1993) argues that boards should be relatively inactive and they have to be more active 
in the presence of problems. Vafeas (1999) assesses this argumentation empirically and re-
ports that, indeed, boards become more active following poor corporate performance. During 
the crises, the boards’ activity is highly important to cope with the occurred difficulties, in 
order to protect shareholders. This inverse relation between performance and board meetings 
is reflected in findings, that boards with more frequent meetings are valued less by the mar-
ket. However, the relation runs from poor performance to higher board activity and not vice 
versa. Empirical results also indicate that for firms with poor prior performance, a high meet-
ing frequency is followed by significant performance improvements during the next years. 
These findings show that the board of directors is a reactive institution rather than proactive 
measure for corporate governance improvements. 
 
In banking, Andres/Vallelado (2008) use the number of meetings held each year as a proxy 
for boards functioning. They found a positive relation between the board frequency and per-
formance of banks indicating the proactive role of board meetings. This relation lacks, how-
ever, statistical significance. 
 
The analysis is also controlled for the number of meetings of non-executive directors. This 
information was, however, not by all banks disclosed. Therefore, only a narrowed sample of 
banks can be assessed. In the regression analysis, the natural logarithm of the frequency of 
meetings per year is used. 
 
 
Board Committees and Auditors Quality 
 
 
Committees, as organizational units of the board of directors, specialize on narrowly defined 
functions. The delegation of specific tasks to the corresponding committees plays an impor-
tant role especially in large corporations. Klein (1998) shows a linkage between the organiza-
tional structure of the boards and firm performance. Although committee existence alone is 
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not reflected in the performance of companies, it demonstrates a positive relation between 
performance and the number of insiders on the finance and investment committees. 
 
Regarding different narrowed tasks, several committees can be established in companies. In 
banking, for instance, nomination, compensation, audit, corporate governance and risk com-
mittees are often observed. The existence of committees is not homogeneous in banks even in 
the same countries. Some banks have only two committees and some banks establish six 
committees on the board. 
 
The nomination committee is responsible for the structure, size and composition of the board. 
It assesses the board independence, reviews qualifications and experience of the board mem-
bers. This committee prepares proposals for the appointment of the CEO and directors. It pre-
pares also the plan for the appointment of successors to the board. Shivdasani/Yermack 
(1999) find that if no nomination committee exists or if the CEO serves on the nomination 
committee, firms appoint fewer outside directors. They also show that the stock price reaction 
to independent director appointments is lower when the CEO serves on the nomination com-
mittee. However, assessing the UK publicly traded companies, McKnight/Weir (2009) report 
that having the nomination committee increases agency costs. 
 
The compensation committee determines the criteria, structure and amount of the remunera-
tion of top-level managers. Analyzing the CEO’s performance, the committee reviews and 
recommends CEO compensation. The compensation committee reviews, adjusts and approves 
the directors’ compensation including the salary and benefits. It also submits a proposal to the 
board of directors for the stock options policy. Sun/Cahan/Emanuel (2009) analyzes the com-
pensation committee governance quality of US listed companies. They find that for firms with 
a high compensation committee quality, the future firms’ performance is more positively as-
sociated with the CEO stock option grants. 
 
The audit committee is responsible for the monitoring of the financial accounting process. It 
controls the internal audit system and effectiveness of compliance and the auditing of finan-
cial statements. It prepares the approval of the annual financial statements and discusses 
changes of the accounting methods. The audit committee recommends and mandates the ex-
ternal auditors monitoring their independence and qualifications. Klein (2002) shows that 
abnormal accruals, as a proxy for earnings management, depend on audit committee inde-
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pendence. The abnormal accruals appear to be more pronounced for firms with less independ-
ent audit committees. 
 
Due to the scarcity of disclosed information, a deep analysis of committee structures is not 
conducted within this thesis. However, the existence of the nomination, compensation and 
audit committees is considered by the corresponding dummy variables. Also, the number of 
committees is included in the regression. To control for the quality of external auditors, an 




Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board 
 
 
The situation when the CEO also holds the title of the chairman of the board can lead to a 
greater CEO control of board decisions. Therefore, CEO duality indicates CEO power (see 
Hermalin/Weisbach (1998), Adams/Almeida/Ferreira (2005), Pathan (2009)). In order to im-
plement an effective monitoring system, it is suggested to separate the chairman and CEO 
positions (see Fama/Jensen (1983), Jensen (1993)). Goyal/Park (2002) show that the sensitiv-
ity of CEO turnover to poor performance is significantly lower when titles of the CEO and 
chairman are combined. It indicates that when the positions are not separated, the CEO power 
increases and independent monitoring of the board is less effective. The lack of independent 
oversight of the management can affect performance of companies. There is, however, no 
strong empirical evidence that CEO duality influences performance negatively (see Brick-
ley/Coles/Jarrell (1997), Beasley/Salterio (2001), Adams/Almeida/Ferreira (2005)).  
 
Thus, the empirical work is not consistent with the view that separation of titles would neces-
sarily improve performance. Adams/Hermalin/Weisbach (2008) argue that if the CEO shows 
high abilities and performs well, he or she can be rewarded by being given the chairman title 
as well. Even if combining these titles leads to increase in CEO power, it does not follow that 
a separation of these positions will improve performance. The authors state that for some cor-
porations CEO duality can be an optimum corporate governance solution, and separating the 
titles would lead to less efficient solutions. 
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In banking, Belkhir (2009) reports even a positive relation between CEO duality and Tobin’s 
q, though only in case of savings banks and not commercial banks. Pathan (2009) considers 
CEO power in case of CEO duality and/or if the CEO is internally-hired. His investigations 
show that CEO power is associated with a lower bank risk-taking. In the analysis of this the-
sis, CEO power is indicated with a dummy variable, which is coded to one in case of CEO 
duality and zero otherwise. 
 
Some empirical studies also analyze personal characteristics of the CEO such as his or her 
tenure and age (see, e.g., Boone et al. (2007), Coles/Naveen/Naveen (2008), 
Linck/Netter/Yang (2008), Brookman/Thistle (2009)). The CEO tenure can be an important 
factor in board monitoring. The perceived abilities of the CEO by the board of directors re-
sults in an increasing CEO tenure. The higher CEO tenure might lead to stronger CEO bar-
gaining power, which would decrease the independence and, therefore, the monitoring of the 
board (see Hermalin/Weisbach (1998), Hermalin (2005)). Ryan/Wang/Wiggins (2009) find 
that CEO tenure indeed influences the board oversight process proxied by the frequency of 
board meetings. They report that the number of meetings decline with the CEO tenure. The 
sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance is, however, unaffected by the CEO tenure. 
The analysis of this thesis takes the CEO’s personal characteristics into account, supposing 
that the CEO’s age and tenure might influence performance and risk-taking behavior of 
banks. The natural logarithm of the variables is used in the regression analysis. 
 
Since executive directors have advantages towards information compared to non-executive 
directors, there is information asymmetry on the board of directors. Wolff/Rapp (2008) argue 
that this information asymmetry can be decreased, when in that company the chairman of the 
board has been a member of the executive board before. Their empirical evidence shows that 
the described situation leads to the reduction of the executive compensation, which might 
indicate lower information asymmetry and, therefore, lower agency costs. In this thesis, a 
dummy variable is considered, which indicates whether a chairman has been an executive 
director before taking his actual position or not.  
 
The German corporate governance code suggests that the chairman of the supervisory board 
should not be the chairman of the audit committee, in order to improve the independence of 
financial statement preparation and auditing by the supervisory board. It is supposed that the 
separation of these positions would positively affect performance of banks. Therefore, an in-
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dicator variable is introduced in the regression that takes the combination of these two posi-






Dispersed ownership and, therefore, the separation of ownership and control can lead to a 
conflict of interests between shareholders and the management (see Berle/Means (1932), Jen-
sen/Meckling (1976)). In widely held companies, small shareholders lack the incentive to 
monitor managers, which leads to free-rider problems (see Stiglitz (1985), Agrawal/Nasser 
(2010)). In contrast, controlling shareholders have strong incentives and effective means to 
monitor management, which reduces agency costs and provides a source of corporate govern-
ance discipline (see Shleifer/Vishny (1986)). However, the interests of large shareholders may 
sometimes not coincide with the interests of small investors. This situation will lead to a new 
agency problem, since large shareholders can use their power to advance their own interests 
(see Bebchuk/Hamdani (2009)). 
 
Thus, it is not obvious whether ownership concentration can present a value maximizing cor-
porate governance instrument. Concerning empirical investigation, Mehran (1995) reports 
that incentive-based compensation of the 153 randomly-selected manufacturing firms in 
1979-1980 declines with the percentage of stocks held by outside blockholders. The author 
interprets this result as evidence that the monitoring by blockholders may be a substitute for 
the incentive pay for executives. Denis/Denis/Sarin (1997) analyze whether ownership struc-
ture affects top executive turnover. They find that the probability of executive turnover to 
firm performance is positively affected by the presence of an outside blockholder. This result 
is also an evidence for the monitoring function of large shareholders. Though, there is no em-
pirical confirmation that controlling shareholders have a positive influence on firm valuation 
(see, e.g., Schmid/Zimmermann (2007)). Beiner et al. (2004) report even a negative relation 







BS Board size: the natural logarithm of total directors on the board 
ED Executive directors: the natural logarithm of the total executives on the board 




BI Board independence: the number of independent (non-affiliated) directors di-
vided by the total number of non-executive directors 
BID Board independence (a dummy variable): indicates whether banks disclose 
independence information or not 
 
Gender Diversity 
GDE Gender diversity among executives: the fraction of female executive directors 
out of all executives 
GDNE Gender diversity among non-executives: the fraction of female non-executive 
directors out of all non-executives 
 
Board Activity 
NM Number of meetings: the natural logarithm of non-executive meetings fre-
quency per year 
 
Board Committees and Auditors Quality 
CN Committees number: the number of existing committees on the board 
NC Nomination committee (a dummy variable): indicates existence of nomination 
committee 
CC Compensation committee (a dummy variable): indicates existence of compen-
sation committee 
AC Audit committee (a dummy variable): indicates existence of audit committee 
Big4 Big 4 (a dummy variable): indicates whether the auditor of a bank belongs to 
Big Four companies 
 
CEO and Chairman of the Board 
CEOD CEO duality: a dummy variable is coded to one if CEO also holds the title of 
chairman of the board 
CEOT CEO tenure: the natural logarithm of CEO tenure 
CEOA CEO age:  the natural logarithm of CEO age 
CHEX Chairman before executive: a dummy variable that considers whether a chair-
man of the board has been before an executive member of the board 
CHAC Chairman is audit committee chairman: a dummy variable, which equals to 
one if chairman of the board is also the chairman of the audit committee 
 
Ownership Concentration 
FRFL Free float: the percentage of shares that are widely held 
  
 




The mixed empirical results can indicate that the governance mechanisms in firms with and 
without controlling shareholders can differ. Bebchuk/Hamdani (2009) devote their paper to 
this issue and argue that investor protection measures in a company without controlling 
shareholder can be irrelevant or even harmful for companies with controlling shareholders. 
Thus in the regression analysis, it is controlled for ownership concentration. A free float vari-
able is introduced in the regression, which measures the proportion of the companies’ shares 








The final sample of analyzed banks consists of 74 European publicly traded banks over the 
period of 2005–2009. The corporate governance data was sourced directly from the annual 
reports of companies. Some information, which was not disclosed in annual reports, was col-
lected from the official web sites of the banks. However, it was not possible to collect infor-
mation about the board independence for each bank, since not every bank has checked inde-
pendence characteristics of their members. Here, board independence data is applied for a 
narrowed sample of banks, which results in 305 bank-year observations. The data concerning 
the number of meetings of non-executive directors is also not complete, which narrows the 
analysis to 255 bank-year observations. The possibility to determine all remaining corporate 
governance variables for a full sample of banks leads to the 370 observations for the regres-
sion analysis. 
 
The summary statistics of the corporate governance characteristics of banks are reported in 
Table 34. Table 35 presents the development of these characteristics during the analyzed time 
period, namely from 2005 until 2009. The notation of the variables is reported in Table 33. 
The values of the board size, executives and non-executives members, board meetings, board 
committees, CEO age and tenure are demonstrated in absolute numbers in Tables 34 and 35. 
In the regression analysis, the natural logarithm of these values is used. 
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The sample has a mean board size of 17.58 directors. Thus in this thesis, boards with a higher 
average number of directors are analyzed compared to the investigations of Andres/Vallelado 
(2008), Belkhir (2009), and Pathan (2009) with a mean board size of 15.78, 13.20, and 12.92 
directors, respectively. However, the board size experiences decreasing trend during the ob-
servation period and declined on average from 18.01 until 17.27 members. This decreasing 
trend is caused mainly by the reduction in non-executives during the observation period. The 
average number of executive members on the board has in contrast increased from 5.84 to 
6.09 directors. The sum of the executive and non-executive directors does not coincide on 
average with the board size, since the sample also consists of banks with a mixed board struc-
ture. 
 
The mean percentage of independent directors is 57 percent for 61 banks that disclosed this 
information. During the analyzed period, the fraction of independent directors has on average 
increased from 0.56 to 0.59. The disclosure of the board independence information has also 
improved, which is indicated by the dummy variable BID. In countries with only one-tier 
adopted board system, the independence of board members varies from 90 to 100 percent. In 
countries with only two-tiered board structure, the independence of directors lies between 50 
and 100 percent. The lowest level of board independence is observed in Greece, Portugal, 
Finland, Cyprus, and Slovakia varying from eleven percent to 40 percent. Several banks from 
Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia have not disclosed information concerning 
the independence of their board members. 
 
The boards of European banks are not highly diversified concerning the gender. Men occupy 
the majority of the positions on the board. Women constitute on average only eight percent 
and twelve percent of executive and non-executive directors, respectively. Among non-
executive directors, the average women fraction stays constant from 2005 until 2009. Gender 
diversity in management is lower compared to supervisory directors, but it has increased from 
seven percent in 2005 to eight percent in 2009. Norway has a stable women fraction of about 
45 percent on the non-executive board during the total sample period due to its legal require-
ments. Sweden, Poland, and Lithuania also have above average gender diversity on their 
boards. Countries like Switzerland, Italy, and Portugal often do not have women on the 





Variable Mean Max Min SD 
 
    
BS, number 17.58 40.00 7.00 5.84 
ED, number 5.94 35.00 1.00 3.40 
NED, number 11.89 29.00 3.00 4.97 
 
    
BI, fraction 0.57 1.00 0.00 0.24 
BID, dummy 0.86 1.00 0.00 0.35 
 
    
GDE, fraction 0.08 0.50 0.00 0.13 
GDNE, fraction 0.12 0.80 0.00 0.12 
 
    
NM, number 10.4 47.00 3.00 6.74 
 
    
CN, number 3.03 7.00 0.00 1.48 
NC, dummy 0.62 1.00 0.00 0.49 
CC, dummy 0.44 1.00 0.00 0.50 
AC, dummy 0.91 1.00 0.00 0.29 
Big4, dummy 0.98 1.00 0.00 0.15 
 
    
CEOD, dummy 0.12 1.00 0.00 0.33 
CEOT, years 4.86 27.00 0.17 4.40 
CEOA, years 53.52 72.00 34.00 7.11 
CHEX, dummy 0.26 1.00 0.00 0.44 
CHAC, dummy 0.10 1.00 0.00 0.30 
     
FRFL, % 56.30 100.00 0.00 31.83 
 
Table 34: Summary statistics of corporate governance variables 
 
 102
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
BS 
Mean 18.01 17.53 17.57 17.51 17.27 
Max 37.00 37.00 39.00 40.00 29.00 
Min 7.00 7.00 7.00 8.00 7.00 
ED 
Mean 5.84 5.89 5.80 6.08 6.09 
Max 19.00 20.00 20.00 21.00 35.00 
Min 2.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 
NED 
Mean 12.31 11.81 11.93 11.73 11.69 
Max 28.00 29.00 24.00 23.00 23.00 
Min 3.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 
BI 
Mean 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.59 
Max 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.13 0.11 
BID 
Mean 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.87 
Max 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
GDE 
Mean 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.08 
Max 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
GDNE 
Mean 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 
Max 0.67 0.46 0.60 0.44 0.80 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NM 
Mean 9.05 9.71 9.67 11.82 11.75 
Max 36.00 36.00 28.00 47.00 37.00 
Min 3.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 
CN 
Mean 2.68 2.86 3.05 3.23 3.31 
Max 6.00 6.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NC 
Mean 0.35 0.39 0.46 0.47 0.50 
Max 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 




  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
CC 
Mean 0.54 0.61 0.62 0.66 0.66 
Max 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AC 
Mean 0.85 0.86 0.91 0.95 0.97 
Max 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Big4 
Mean 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.99 
Max 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CEOD 
Mean 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.14 
Max 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CEOT 
Mean 4.12 4.58 4.91 5.30 5.37 
Max 23.00 24.00 25.00 26.00 27.00 
Min 0.17 0.17 0.33 0.17 0.17 
CEOA 
Mean 52.95 53.36 53.22 53.43 54.65 
Max 68.00 69.00 70.00 71.00 72.00 
Min 39.00 34.00 35.00 36.00 40.00 
CHEX 
Mean 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.24 0.24 
Max 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CHAC 
Mean 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.08 
Max 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
FRFL 
Mean 57.37 57.93 57.09 55.23 53.85 
Max 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 




The boards hold on average 10.4 meetings per year during the observed period with a range 
between three and 47 meetings. The maximum average number of board meetings is docu-
mented in 2008, which is connected with problems of the financial crisis. Such meetings be-
havior is consistent with the reactive role of board meetings, i.e., a high meetings frequency 
when shareholders’ interests are in particular danger (see Vafeas (1999)). All Greek banks in 
the sample do not provide information concerning the board meetings in their annual reports. 
Also, the majority of the banks from Poland do not disclose this information. 
 
An average board establishes 3.03 committees, whereas the number of committees has in-
creased during the sample period from 2.68 to 3.31. Some banks have no committees on their 
boards, and one German bank has seven committees – the maximum committee number in the 
sample. The existence of compensation, nomination, and audit committees is more often pro-
nounced during the analyzed years, which is indicated by the positive trend of the correspond-
ing dummy variables. In contrast to other committees, the audit committee is established by 
the majority of the banks. Also, most of the banks are audited by the Big 4 companies. 
 
In twelve percent of the sample observations, the CEO also holds the chairman position. This 
characteristic is relative stable during the years; it ranges from 11 percent to 14 percent. The 
average CEO in the sample had taken his or her position for 4.86 years with the standard de-
viation of the employment period of 4.40 years. The maximum CEO tenure of 27 years in 
2009 is observed in one Danish bank. The CEO is on average 53 years old with a standard 
deviation of 7 years. In one Italian bank, the CEO was aged 72 in 2009, and he had taken his 
position since the beginning of the sample period. The youngest CEO took his position at the 
age of 34 in a Latvian bank. 
 
The situation when the chairman of the board has been the executive member of the board 
before is strongly pronounced in Swedish banks within the observed sample. This situation is 
also common in Germany, Austria, Spain, Lithuania, and Slovakia. During the observation 
period, the chairman of the board becomes less likely to be on the management board before. 
On average, 26 percent of the banks in the sample have chairmen who have sat on the execu-
tive board before. 
 
The chairman of the board is considered to be the chairman of the audit committee only in ten 
percent of all sample cases. Thus, the combination of these positions is not common in 
Europe. However, it is widely spread in Austrian banks not to separate these positions. Also, 
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several banks in Denmark, Portugal, and Lithuania have the same head person for the position 
in the board and audit committee. On average, there is an increasing trend of separation of 
these positions during the observation period, which can indicate the importance of this board 
feature for the controlling and monitoring activities. 
 
The data concerning the ownership structure is taken from the annual reports of banks. The 
free float of banks is calculated by: 100 percent less the shareholdings of strategic and large 
investors as well as parent companies. As strategic shareholders, managers and directors, 
families, financial institutions and government are considered. Also, other large shareholders 
(e.g., non-financial companies, individuals) are taken into account, who own more than five 
percent of the companies’ shares. The average free float percentage of shares has decreased 
from 57.37 to 53.85 over the observation period. There are banks in the sample with complete 
control of their parent companies and, therefore, with no free float shares. The sample also 
includes the banks that are absolute widely held with the free float shares of 100 percent. 
Banks in Hungary, Poland, Latvia, and Slovakia are often under control of their individual or 
family owners as well as their parent companies. Therefore, the free float of the banks in these 
countries is significantly below average. 
 
 
5.3 Corporate Governance Impact on Performance of Banks 
 
 
Analyzing the relation between performance and corporate governance characteristics, many 
studies have used either OLS or fixed-effects estimation (see, e.g., Mehran (1995), Klein 
(1998), Yermack (1996), Belkhir (2009)). The OLS estimation is unbiased only in case of 
independently and identically distributed error terms. The panel data can be affected by the 
unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity that causes serial correlation in residuals. The fixed-
effects model adjusts for unit-specific differences including firm dummies in the regression. 
Within this estimation model, the firm-specific heterogeneity is considered to stay constant 
over time and be correlated with independent variables. Economically, this heterogeneity is 
unobservable for the researchers, however, it may influence the performance and the explana-
tory variables (corporate governance characteristics and other control variables). For instance, 
differences in managerial abilities or the CEO’s risk aversion can certainly affect a firm’s 
performance (see Wintoki/Linck/Netter (2011), Schultz/Tan/Walsh (2010)). 
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However, Wintoki/Linck/Netter (2011) highlight two additional sources of econometric en-
dogeneity in case of a performance-governance relation, which are not overcome by the fixed-
effects estimation model. The next source of endogeneity is related to simultaneity, which 
occurs if governance mechanisms and performance are determined simultaneously. For ex-
ample, the firm chooses in a given period a corresponding board structure with the aim to 
achieve a particular level of performance in this period, or in reverse case – board characteris-
tics may be determined based on a firm’s performance. In case of simultaneity existence, the 
fixed-effects estimated parameters are biased. However, estimating a system of equations, 
where corporate governance mechanisms depend on performance and, at the same time, per-
formance depends on corporate governance characteristics will lead to unbiased results. 
Though applying the econometric system approach, the identification of strictly exogenous 
instruments is required, which is difficult in practice. 
 
Finally, Wintoki/Linck/Netter (2011) argue that the governance-performance relation is af-
fected by dynamic endogeneity, if the past performance of a firm explicitly affects its current 
corporate governance mechanism. For instance, according to the Hermalin/Weisbach (1998) 
model, the board independence is negatively correlated to the CEO bargaining power that 
increases with the positive past firm performance. Also, the board decomposition is related to 
past performance, since the board of directors can be replaced in case of poor performance. 
Empirically, it was also confirmed that the current corporate governance mechanism is af-
fected by the past actions and characteristics of a firm (see, e.g., Boone et al. (2007), 
Linck/Netter/Yang (2008), Wintoki/Linck/Netter (2011)). 
 
























where y represent performance measure, x vector denotes corporate governance characteris-
tics, and z variables stand for control variables. The sources of endogeneity are recognized as 
follows:62 
 
                                                 
62
  See Wintoki/Linck/Netter (2011). 
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• Dynamic relation between performance and governance characteristics is considered 
by the introduced lagged independent variables as dependent variable( ktiy −, ) in the re-
gression; 


















itlit zxε , where itε  is a 
random error term; 


















itli zxη , 
where iη  is an unobserved firm effect. 
 
In case of the aforementioned sources of endogeneity, the dynamic generalized method of 
moments (GMM) estimator provides consistent and unbiased estimation results. The differ-
ence GMM technique was introduced by Holtz-Eakin/Newey/Rosen (1988) and 
Arellano/Bond (1991) an later developed to the system GMM framework by Arellano/Bover 
(1995) and Blundell/Bond (1998). The dynamic panel GMM estimation is increasingly popu-
lar in recent corporate governance research papers (see, e.g., Schultz/Tan/Walsh (2010), 
Hoechle et al. (2011), Wintoki/Linck/Netter (2011)), since this method is robust to all en-
dogeneity sources mentioned above. This estimation method also allows individual-specific 
patterns of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of idiosyncratic error terms (see Roodman 
(2009b)). 
 
Observing strictly endogenous variables, instrumental variables may be used to absorb the 
correlation between the regressors and the error term. In contrast to two- or three-stage least 
squares estimation, the GMM can use not only exogenous instruments, but also internal in-
struments – lagged levels of endogenous variables. The lagged dependent variables are also 
instrumented by their lagged values. The difference GMM transforms the regression equation 
























However, under certain conditions, the variables in levels may be weak instruments for the 
first-differenced equations (see Arellano/Bover (1995)). In order to obtain more efficient es-
timates, the system GMM can be applied. Additionally to the differenced equation, the system 
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Adding the second equation, new instruments have to be obtained. Here, the variables in lev-
els are instrumented with their own lagged differences. The introduced equation in levels in-
cludes, however, unobserved heterogeneity. Thus, the system GMM requires an additional 
assumption, namely, that the correlations between the regressors and the unobserved effects 
stay constant over time. 
 
The system GMM uses higher number of instruments than the difference GMM does. It is 
important to consider the number of instruments used in the estimation, since dynamic panel 
models can generate “too many weak” instruments, which can lead to biased estimates (see 
Roodman (2009a)). The rule of thumb implies that the number of instruments should not ex-
ceed the number of observed panels. 
 
There are two main diagnostics tests within the dynamic GMM estimation: the test of overi-
dentifying restriction and the test of autocorrelation of the first and second order. 
Arellano/Bond’s (1991) test for autocorrelation has a null hypothesis of no autocorrelation in 
idiosyncratic disturbance terms. Testing for serial correlation in levels, the first-order autocor-
relation (AR (1)) exists in the first-differenced errors by construction, but there should be no 
second-order autocorrelation (AR (2)) in error differences. The second test (Sargan or Hansen 
J statistics) of overidentification has a null hypothesis that the instruments are exogenous. 
Here, high p values indicate that the instruments are valid in the model specification. 
 








































The dependent variable y denotes performance or risk measure. The risk and performance 
factors, used for this estimation, are described in Sections 2.2 and 2.3; they are also summa-
rized in Table 2. First, the whole board size (BS) is used for the estimation. Afterwards, the 
influence of the number of executive (ED) or non-executive directors (NED) is separately 
estimated. Therefore, these variables are presented in the brackets in formula (59). Also for 
the complete sample, only board independence dummy variable (BID) can be applied, then 
the fraction of board independence (BI) is used for the narrowed sample of observations. The 
data concerning the number of meetings (NM) held during the year is also not complete, so 
that the number of observations is reduced analyzing this governance feature. The description 
and computation of all corporate governance variables are presented in Table 33. 
 
Equation (59) includes also a vector of control variables (z). In the analysis, it is controlled 
for: 
 
• Cost efficiency (CE); 
• Asset size (natural logarithm of assets); 
• Financial structure (leverage ratio); 
• Profitability of banks (return on equity); 
• Income diversification (non-interest income over net operating income); 
• GDP (natural logarithm of GDP per capita); 
• Inflation rate. 
 
The correlation coefficients between corporate governance parameters are reported in Table 
36. In the sample, larger non-executive boards are seemed to exhibit a lower fraction of inde-
pendent directors. There is a positive significant correlation between the board size and com-
mittee number. It indicates that larger boards are supposed to establish more committees, in 
order to delegate their work in a proper way. This can lead to the reduction of communication 
problems and to the improvement of the board monitoring function. The CEO age is posi-
tively correlated with the board size implying that larger boards appoint older CEOs. The 
higher fraction of independent directors on the board is associated with a rarer occurrence of 
CEO duality. Banks with larger proportion of free float shares have more directors on the 
boards, exhibit a higher board independence, and establish more committees on the board. 
This can be interpreted that in case of concentrated ownership, there is an additional govern-
ance mechanism of controlling shareholder. Dispersed ownership structure, however, needs a 
higher number of committees and more independent directors for better control of managers. 
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Applying the GMM estimator for the analysis, the corporate governance variables are consid-
ered to be strictly endogenous; the control variables are treated as exogenous measures in the 
respective estimation. The two-step difference GMM model is used for analysis, since the 
system GMM leads to a high number of instruments, which explicitly exceeds the number of 
panels – 74 banks in this case. Schultz/Tan/Walsh (2010) find a causal relation between gov-
ernance and firm performance applying either the pooled OLS technique or the fixed-effects 
model. Since these models are not robust to all sources of possible endogeneity, the authors 
employ the dynamic difference and system GMM panel methods of estimation. The results of 
both methods are similar and show no significant relation between corporate governance and 
performance, indicating that OLS and fixed-effects estimates are biased and unreliable. 
 
The observed sample, however, does not eliminate the relation between governance character-
istics and the performance of banks. The results of the GMM specification concerning per-
formance and risk factors are outlined in Tables 37 and 38, respectively. The diagnostics tests, 
presented in Tables 37 and 38, confirm the reliability of the used models and instruments. 
Thus, the statistical test of second-order autocorrelation in the error differences is insignifi-
cant. Also, the Hansen J statistics indicate that the instruments used are valid in the estima-
tion. 
 
Analyzing European banks, the achieved results indicate that the board size influences the 
performance of banks significantly (see Table 37). Banks with larger boards show a higher 
rate of return and Jensen’s alpha. Andres/Vallelado (2008) and Belkhir (2009) report a posi-
tive relation between the board size and Tobin’s q, whereas the latter author applies the fixed-
effects technique for the estimation. In the investigation of this thesis, Tobin’s q stays unaf-
fected by the board size; however, capital market performance is driven by the total number 
of directors. Considering the analysis of Coles/Naveen/Naveen (2008), the findings indicate 
the complexity of the bank industry due to high leverage, diversification policy, untransparent 
financial engineering etc. This leads to the need of large boards for better monitoring and 




 BS ED NED BI BID GDE GDNE NM CN NC CC AC Big4 CEOD CEOT CEOA CHEX CHAC FRFL 
BS 1.00                   
ED 0.50 1.00                  
NED 0.88 0.09 1.00                 
BI -0.27 0.06 -0.33 1.00                
BID 0.05 -0.16 0.14 
– 
1.00               
GDE -0.02 0.07 -0.07 0.06 -0.09 1.00              
GDNE 0.01 0.09 -0.02 0.10 0.07 0.09 1.00             
NM 0.01 0.13 -0.04 
– 
0.12 -0.09 0.19 1.00            
CN 0.35 0.14 0.34 0.23 0.36 -0.07 -0.05 0.27 1.00           
NC 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.15 0.26 -0.16 -0.09 0.50 0.56 1.00          
CC 0.06 0.19 0.01 -0.05 0.18 -0.06 -0.15 0.62 0.41 0.49 1.00         
AC 0.14 0.21 0.07 0.08 -0.02 0.13 0.03 0.19 0.53 0.28 0.37 1.00        
Big4 0.05 -0.06 0.10 -0.08 -0.06 -0.05 -0.01 -0.23 -0.01 0.13 -0.08 -0.05 1.00       
CEOD -0.14 -0.08 -0.09 -0.12 -0.25 -0.00 -0.08 0.00 -0.18 -0.02 0.06 0.01 0.06 1.00      
CEOT -0.02 0.09 -0.04 -0.08 0.02 -0.04 0.04 -0.07 -0.11 -0.13 -0.08 -0.14 -0.00 0.07 1.00     
CEOA 0.38 0.13 0.35 -0.24 -0.06 -0.16 -0.13 0.10 0.20 -0.01 0.13 0.07 0.03 0.12 0.31 1.00    
CHEX 0.09 0.15 0.04 0.07 -0.28 0.28 0.15 -0.06 -0.04 0.02 -0.09 0.12 0.05 0.30 -0.17 -0.18 1.00   
CHAC 0.03 -0.12 0.09 0.13 0.03 0.16 0.06 -0.29 -0.04 -0.22 -0.30 0.01 -0.01 -0.13 0.12 0.04 0.13 1.00  
FRFL 0.08 0.13 0.09 0.30 0.04 -0.23 0.12 0.57 0.33 0.45 0.33 0.15 0.01 -0.06 0.08 0.11 -0.05 -0.15 1.00 
 
Table 36: Correlation matrix between corporate governance parameters (numbers in bold indicate significance at 10% level or better) 
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 Market-oriented Acc.-based 
 R  α Tobin’s q M/B RIadj 
BS 3.0513*** 3.0575*** -0.0233 3.1393 -0.0228 
(ED) (0.8910) (0.8759) (-0.0428) (0.5853) (-0.0396) 
(NED) (1.6675) (1.6876) (0.0163) (1.0036) (-0.0549) 
(BI) (-0.001) (-0.0015) (-0.0389) (-0.0257) (-0.0020) 
BID 0.0877 0.0681 -0.0352 0.8621 0.0875 
GDE 0.0409*** 0.0422*** -0.0000 0.0179 -0.0016 
GDNE -0.0023 -0.0017 -0.0004 -0.0375 -0.0040 
(NM) (-0.1348) (-0.3880) (0.2029**) (0.0567) (0.1118*) 
CN -1.2086 -1.2082 -0.0638 -1.5144 -0.0072 
NC 0.2879 0.2746 0.0271 -0.5567 0.1206 
CC 2.0314* 2.0634* 0.2137 4.5910 0.0945 
AC 0.6891 0.6869 -0.0388 0.5296 0.0554 
Big4 2.0918*** 2.1475*** 0.3359 3.5665 0.1225 
CEOD 0.4123 0.4129 -0.0017 1.6328 0.0824 
CEOT 0.2305 0.2328 0.0598 0.5226 0.0088 
CEOA -0.5163 -0.5100 -0.5664 -9.0680 0.1857 
CHEX 0.7753 0.7699 -0.1576 0.8610 0.0699 
CHAC -0.2583 -0.2483 -0.0833 -2.5129 0.0138 
FRFL 0.0180 0.0186 0.0019 0.0245 -0.0011 
1−ty  -0.9273*** -0.9723*** 0.1385 0.0678 -0.3598 
CE 1.0431*** 1.0510*** 0.0754 0.8853 0.0598 
      
Model fits:      
Wald 2χ -statistics 683.23*** 657.01*** 31.01 53.96*** 195.57*** 
AR(1) -2.10** -2.03** 0.25 -0.60 0.21 
AR(2) -0.53 -0.52 -0.39 -0.32 0.54 
Hansen J statistics 26.91 27.07 12.15 16.64 27.63 
(p-value) (0.58) (0.57) (0.99) (0.968) (0.573) 
No. of instruments 52 52 52 52 52 
No. of observations 222 222 222 222 222 
 
Table 37: Regression results of performance measures on corporate governance charac-
teristics (***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, 
resp.; control variables are not reported here) 
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 σ PD MZ  Z  LLP 
BS -0.8099 -0.1510 2.7143* 0.0244 -0.0156 
(ED) (-0.1179) (0.0257) (1.0251) (-0.0268) (-0.0033) 
(NED) (-0.4440) (-0.1631) (1.2515) (-0.0160) (0.0006) 
(BI) (0.0026) (0.0013) (0.0021) (-0.0012) (-0.0000) 
BID -0.7429* -0.2445 0.6117 0.0714 -0.0163 
GDE 0.0061 0.0005 -0.0073 0.0006 0.0001 
GDNE 0.0170 0.0026 -0.0464 0.0011 0.0004 
(NM) (-0.3720) (0.0029) (-1.0206) (0.0919) (-0.0107) 
CN -0.0878 -0.0243 0.9479 -0.1374 -0.0106 
NC 0.2241 0.0935 -1.1092 0.2256** -0.0021 
CC -0.3078 0.0174 0.0196 0.0852 0.0279 
AC 0.2770 0.0234 -0.6175 0.0614 0.0135** 
Big4 -0.3956 0.2609** 1.3841 -0.0113 0.0216 
CEOD 0.2505 0.0878 -0.0100 0.0713 0.0081 
CEOT -0.2040** -0.0048 0.3927* 0.0402 -0.0027 
CEOA 3.6239*** 0.2252 -7.2233*** 0.2212 0.0244 
CHEX 0.3097 -0.1639 -0.2792 0.1777 -0.0001 
CHAC 1.2171 0.2312 -5.5684*** 0.0621 0.0212 
FRFL -0.0089 0.0011 -0.0007 -0.0004 0.0003 
1−ty  0.8030** 0.3245 0.5615** 0.0325 0.0932 
CE 0.2209 0.1084* 0.4707 0.0517 0.0032 
      
Model fits:      
Wald 2χ -statistics 272.45*** 179.40*** 296.74*** 607.19*** 348.93*** 
AR(1) -2.05** -0.31 -2.28** -1.71* -1.11 
AR(2) -0.48 -1.45 0.18 1.46 -0.56 
Hansen J statistics 24.00 23.08 23.83 20.44 32.80 
(p-value) (0.73) (0.77) (0.73) (0.90) (0.29) 
No. of instruments 52 52 52 52 52 
No. of observations 222 222 222 222 222 
 
Table 38: Regression results of risk measures on corporate governance characteristics 
(***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, resp.; con-




The international analysis of Andres/Vallelado (2008) confirms a hypothesized inverted U-
shaped relation between board size and performance measure. Therefore, it is also tested for a 
quadratic relationship between the board size and performance. The quadratic board size vari-
able still exhibits a positive significant impact on the performance measures. Thus, similar to 
Belkhir (2009), an inverted U-shaped relation between board size and performance is not con-
firmed in the sample of European commercial banks. 
 
Gender diversity on the non-executive board has a negative but non-significant effect on per-
formance and the value of banks. Adams/Ferreira (2009) explain that the negative relation can 
occur due to an overmonitoring of the firms. Nevertheless, the significance is missing in the 
analysis. The presence of women on management boards improves, however, the market per-
formance of banks significantly. 
 
Board activity, measured by the number of meetings held per year by non-executive directors, 
is found to be relevant to the firm and shareholder value. Tobin’s q and accounting-oriented 
residual income are positively affected by the number of meetings. Thus, the results indicate 
that a higher frequency of board meetings leads to an improvement of monitoring activities, 
which increases shareholder value.  
 
Among board committees, only the presence of the compensation committee shows a signifi-
cant positive influence on the capital market performance of banks. It implies that the compe-
tent managing remuneration of executive directors based on their performance leads to a bet-
ter governance of companies, which is reflected in their positive excess rates of return. Thus, 
the construction and implementation of compensation plans and incentive schemes reduces 
agency problems between top-level managers and shareholders resulting in a better perform-
ance of banks. The market performance is also influenced by the presence of reputed auditors. 
The external Big 4 auditors are seemed to provide a guarantee of reliability of reported finan-
cial information of banks. 
 
Concerning the risk-taking behavior of banks, the market-oriented Z-score outlines that banks 
with larger boards are associated to take less risk. These results are consistent with the find-
ings of Cheng (2008) and Pathan (2009). The achieved results in this thesis illustrate addi-
tionally that banks with large boards take less risk and in parallel improve their performance. 
Table 39 also shows that the banks, which report their board independence, exhibit a lower 
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volatility of the stock returns. This can be interpreted that banks with more disclosed informa-
tion are considered to be more reliable by the capital market. 
 
The existence of the nomination committee reduces the distance to default measured by the 
accounting-based Z-score. The presence of the audit committee shows a positive significant 
impact on the establishment of loan loss provisions. Analyzing the indeed occurred loan 
losses, there is still a positive significant sign (0.0078***) between the audit committee and 
dependent variable. These non-contradicting results imply that due to the audit committee 
there is no accounting manipulation of loan loss provisions. 
 
The personal characteristics of the CEO are significant in explaining the risk behavior of 
banks. The findings show that there is a negative relation between the CEO tenure and level 
of risk. This evidence might imply that the risk aversion of long-tenured CEOs increases dur-
ing their time in office. Interestingly, acquiring deeper knowledge and job-specific skill, 
CEOs reduce strategic risks. However, older CEOs are less risk-averse than their younger 
colleagues. The accumulated experience of the older CEOs enables them to value risky pro-
jects in a proper way and to support new risky investments. 
 
The distance to default decreases if the chairman of the board is also the chairman of the audit 
committee. It indicates that the coincidence of these positions can lead to disadvantages and, 
thus, increases the risk of banks. Therefore, the German corporate governance code suggests 






The crucial role of the banking industry for the economy motivates researches to find out im-
portant performance and risk drivers of banks. The performance indicators can support the 
decision making process and, therefore, lead to a successful shareholder value creation pro-
cess. Thus, assessment of performance drivers is important and popular in recent empirical 
work. 
 
This thesis concentrates on efficiency and corporate governance characteristics of European 
commercial banks. It investigates the relationship between these factors and performance in 
the financial sector. The empirical study of the thesis focus on publicly traded commercial 
banks from 27 European countries between 2004 and 2009.  
 
In the thesis, efficiency is measured by constructing non-parametric frontiers using DEA on the 
cost, revenue and profit sides. Decomposing these efficiencies in their components allows a 
detailed analysis of value and risk drivers in the banking industry. In this framework, overall, 
allocative, technical, pure technical and scale efficiency is measured. Additionally, the 
Malmquist index and its components are computed to provide a clearer picture of the basic 
sources of productivity change over time. The Malmquist index is decomposed into technolog-
ical change, representing a shift in the efficient frontier, and technical efficiency change.  
 
Calculating the efficiency of banks, the required financial data is hand-collected directly from 
the banks’ financial statements. To eliminate differences in accounting standards, annual finan-
cial statements reported under the IFRS were considered. In contrast to most previous studies, 
both production and intermediation models are applied to determine efficiency. Within the 
production model, banks are considered as operating units, which use labor, capital, and other 
resources to provide their products and services. Here, deposits present the output of bank ac-
tivity, since they are a part of the supplied bank products. The intermediation approach treats 
banks as financial intermediaries, which collect their monetary funds from savers and investors 
and transpose these funds into further investments. Deposits, as the savings of clients, are con-
sidered as the input factor within this model. Comparing the results achieved with these models 
 117
shows, that the intermediation model obtains significantly higher efficiency scores than the 
production model. 
 
In the next step of the thesis, it was analyzed whether the production and the intermediation 
models have different explanatory power for the performance of banks. For that purposes, sev-
eral market-oriented and accounting-based performance and risk measures were determined 
and analyzed. The average rate of return, Jensen’s alpha, Tobin’s q, the market-to-book ratio 
and the residual income were calculated to measure the achieved performance of banks. The 
residual income was adjusted by loan loss provisions and deferred taxes, in order to eliminate 
accounting distortions. It was also empirically confirmed in this thesis, that the adjusted residu-
al income has a higher explanatory power of rates of return compared to the non-adjusted one. 
The risk level of banks is measured by the volatility of stock returns, the probability of default 
based on Merton’s model, and the distance to default (Z-score). Here, also loan loss provisions 
and occurred losses on loans were assessed.  
 
The generalized random effect technique is applied, in order to assess the relation between ef-
ficiency change and the performance of banks. The regression results show that the production 
model has a strongly higher explanatory power concerning the performance of banks. The in-
termediation model, however, seems to superiorly predict risk. Analyzing the impact of the 
efficiency change between two periods on performance and risk, the efficiency scores are de-
composed into the allocative, scale, and pure technical efficiency. The findings indicate that 
scale efficiency drives the capital market performance of banks. Also, the allocative efficiency 
of banks improves their performance. The pure technical efficiency is insignificant for rates of 
return and Jensen’s alpha, but it decreases significantly Tobin’s q and the market-to-book ratio 
of the analyzed sample. On the other hand side, the market-oriented risk measures show that 
the risk-taking increases in banks with the pure technical efficiency. It implies that managers 
improve their ability to use resources in an efficient way by taking more risk, which leads to 
the reduction of the market value of banks. Allocative efficiency is associated with risk reduc-
tion; scale efficiency stays insignificant regarding the risk measures. 
 
Thus, the ability to choose the right operating size and the ability to manage competitive input 
and output prices drive the performance in the banking industry. However, the pure ability to 
manage input and output quantities is improved due to the participation in higher risk. The lat-
ter effect leads to market value reduction. Cost efficiency exhibits the strongest influence on 
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the market-oriented performance compared with another efficiency scores. Profit efficiency 
does not possess a strong effect on the performance of banks. 
 
The second part of the analysis is concentrated on the corporate governance characteristics of 
European banks and their influence on performance. The analysis starts with the board specif-
ics of European banks. There are the unitary, the two-tier and mixed types of boards in Euro-
pean countries. Here, the number of executive and non-executive directors is taken into ac-
count. Also, the whole number of board members is involved in the investigation.  
 
The importance of board independence is also considered in the analysis. Here, the fraction of 
independent directors on the board is assessed. Since, some of the banks do not provide in-
formation about independence of their directors, the dummy variable is used, which indicates 
whether banks disclose this information or not.  
 
The proponents of governance reforms in leading European countries (Germany, France, 
Norway, the Netherlands) promote the gender diversity on the boards, since this can improve 
board functioning and may lead under certain circumstances to a better performance (see Ad-
ams/Ferreira (2009)). Therefore, gender diversity on the management and supervisory boards 
is also assessed in the study. The board activity, measured by the number of meetings of di-
rectors, the existence of nomination, compensation, and audit committees are expected to 
have an influence on the governance of companies. Also, the auditors quality is considered 
with a dummy variable equals to one if auditors belong to Big 4. 
 
The effective monitoring system of a bank can be affected by CEO duality, whereas the CEO 
power increases. This can lead to a less oversight of the managers and, therefore, to share-
holders’ disadvantages. The personal characteristics of the CEO, such as his or her tenure and 
age, might mirror his or her abilities and, thus, might influence the CEO’s managing policy. 
The chairman of the board in some banks also chairs the audit committee, which can disturb 
the independent financial statement preparation. If the chairman of the board has been the 
member of the executive board in a company before, the information asymmetries between 
executive and non-executive directors can be decreased (see Wolff/Rapp (2008)). 
 
Thus, the influence of the board, CEO and chairman characteristics is assessed in the thesis. 
Additionally, it is controlled for ownership concentration. Since large shareholders have 
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strong incentives to monitor managers, they can be treated as an additional governance 
mechanism. Therefore, the free float variable is introduces in the regression.  
 
The governance-performance relation is affected by three sources of endogeneity (see Win-
toki/Linck/Netter (2011)): 
 
• Unobserved heterogeneity; 
• Simultaneity; 
• Dynamic endogeneity. 
 
In this case, the OLS and the fixed-effects regression techniques will lead to biased results. 
The GMM estimation is robust to the aforementioned sources of endogeneity. The difference 
GMM technique is applied in the thesis, since the system GMM generates more instruments 
than the number of observed panels (banks). In the regression analysis, it is controlled for the 
cost efficiency level, bank-specific and macroeconomic parameters. 
 
Taking into account all sources of endogeneity and applying the GMM, Schultz/Tan/Walsh 
(2010) do not observe any causal relation between the governance and firm performance. In 
contrast to their findings, a significant relation between corporate governance and the per-
formance of European publicly traded banks was obtained. The board size drives the capital 
market performance of banks. This finding indicates that banks as complex units gain from 
larger boards. Here, an inverted U-shaped relation was not found contrasting the results of 
Andres/Vallelado (2008). Also, the distance to default increases as the number of board 
members increases. 
 
Gender diversity seems to indeed influence bank performance. However, the diversity among 
management members only is significant in case of capital market performance measures. The 
existence of a compensation committee, the number of board meetings held per year and re-
puted auditors are reflected in the performance. The personal characteristics of the CEO are 
crucial for the risk-taking behavior of banks. The results imply that the longer the CEO takes 
his or her position, the higher his or her risk-aversion is. However, the older CEOs, perhaps 
due to their cumulative experience, are able to support new risky opportunities better. 
 
Two popular corporate governance measures, namely, CEO duality and board independence 
do not influence significantly the performance of banks in the analized sample. This can im-
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ply that combining CEO and chairman titles can be an optimal solution for a given company, 
which does not necessarily destroy its performance (see Adams/Hermalin/Weisbach (2008)). 
Consistent with Belkhir (2009), board independence does not influence the performance of 
European commercial banks. The banks, which check their board independence, are seemed 
to exhibit a lower stock return volatility indicating that the capital market considers the dis-
closure of this information. 
 
Thus, it was shown in this thesis that the efficiency level and governance characteristics are 
crucial for the European bank performance. Differing from the production industry, banking 
has its specifics also in an efficiency- and governance-performance relation. This should be 
taken into consideration while important strategic decisions are made by shareholders and the 
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